Equilibrium Selection and Stability for the Groves Ledyard Mechanism

In their seminal paper Groves and Ledyard (1976) construct a balanced incentive compatible mechanism that solves the free rider problem. In subsequent research, Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (1983) prove that there exist numerous asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. In the present paper, we explicitly solve for the additional equilibria and use computational experiments to examine the structure and stability of the set of equilibria of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism. We find that all of the equilibria found by Berstrom, Simon, and Titus are unstable and that for a high level of the punishment parameter these equilibria do not exist. Further, we find that there exists an additional boundary equilibrium for each of the equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus. The boundary equilibria are all stable.     

Intellectual Capital Profiles: An Examination of Investments and Returns*

ABSTRACT Using data collected from executives in 208 organizations, this study takes a configurational approach to examine how human, social, and organizational capital coexist to form distinct intellectual capital profiles across organizations. We then examine how investments in human resource management (HRM), information technology (IT), and research and development (R&D) differ across these intellectual capital profiles and investigate differences in financial returns and Tobin's q between the profiles. Results indicate that a relatively small group of superior performing organizations exhibit high levels of human, social, and organizational capital. Most firms, however, tend to focus primarily on only one form of intellectual capital, and a small group of underperforming organizations have very low levels of all three types of intellectual capital. At a general level, HRM and IT investments appear to influence intellectual capital development more than R&D investments. More specifically, HRM investments tend to be higher in firms with profiles high in human and social capital, while IT investments are stronger in firms with profiles high in social capital. Further, HRM, IT, and R&D investments are all very high in the group of superior performing organizations that have high levels of human, social, and organizational capital.     

Using Contingent Valuation to Measure User and Nonuser Benefits: An Application to Public Transit

The contingent valuation method (CVM) was used to measure the value of a community service, rural transit, that has both user and nonuser values. Traditional focus groups and a CVM questionnaire provide estimates of willingness to pay and willingness to accept. Tobit analysis was used to test relationships among the variables. Income was not related to the amount of perceived benefit, but the alternative desire to provide transit for others was statistically significant. Ranges for possible total benefits, user and nonuser, are provided for the test transit systems. Proper aggregation of benefits to the population was found to be critical.     

Surveying Farmers: A Case Study

A large percentage of farmers do not respond to mail surveys. To gain insight into why farmers do not respond and how to improve response rates, a three-step research design was developed. First, an initial survey, based on in-person interviews with 15 farmers, was sent to 100 farmers. Second, farmers who did not respond to this mail survey were contacted by phone to investigate the reasons for not responding. Third, based on the information from these nonrespondents, the survey instrument was revised and sent to 3,990 U.S. farmers. Our studies show that the period in which the survey is sent is a crucial factor in the willingness to participate, along with the form and amount of compensation, the sender of the questionnaire, and the perceived length of the questionnaire.     

United Grain Growers: Enterprise Risk Management and Weather Risk

In August of 1999, Mike McAndless, the risk manager of United Grain Growers (UGG), was preparing for a meeting with the firm's chief financial officer, Peter Cox. Mike and Peter had spent considerable time over the past three years with representatives of the Willis Group Ltd., a large international insurance broker, identifying and measuring UGG's major sources of risk. The risk assessment process indicated that, although UGG hedged most of its currency and commodity price risk and purchased insurance against property and liability losses, the firm's earnings still exhibited substantial volatility. This volatility was, in large part, due to the weather. Mike and Peter had to decide whether to retain the risk or shift it to another party using one of two innovative contractual arrangements: weather derivatives or a new type of insurance contract.     

Corporate Governance, Internal Decision Making, and the Invisible Hand

Proponents of the dominant contemporary model of corporate governance maintain that the shareholder is the primary constituent of the firm. The responsibility for managerial decision makers in this governance system is to maximize shareholder wealth. Neoclassical economists ethically justify this objective with their interpretation of Adam Smith's notion of the Invisible Hand. Using a famous quotation from The Wealth of Nations, they interpret the Invisible Hand as Smith's (An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen &; Co., London) assertion that market participants, in pursuing their own self-interests without regard to the interests of others, will collectively provide the optimal economic benefit to society. We argue that the traditional interpretation of Smith is too narrow and potentially harmful to society. In order to fully understand Smith's notion of the influence of the Invisible Hand on human behavior, one must also consider The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In that work, Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, A. Millar, London) portrays the pursuit of self-interest as only one of several potential motivations for human action. He also acknowledged the existence of a “sympathy principle,” which refers to the ability and propensity of human beings to consider the interests of others. Heilbroner (The Essential Adam Smith, W.W. Norton, New York, p. 59) suggests that Smith's sympathy principle allows one to “determine the appropriate degree of self-interest, the proper display of benevolence, the desirable strictness of justice.” In fact, Smith indicates that (1) a society whose members pursue self-interest without a sense of justice will eventually collapse; (2) a society whose members pursue self-interest checked by their sense of justice alone will survive; (3) a society whose members pursue self-interest, justice, and the interests of others will flourish. Since a more complete reading of Smith indicates that human beings, in considering their own interests, also reflexively consider the interests of others when making decisions, then the traditional corporate governance model appears to be lacking. A broader, multiple stakeholder approach to corporate governance that considers the interests of other constituencies may be more consistent with Smith's views. In particular, Smith's sympathy principle provides a theoretical foundation for a shift away from the narrow, yet dominant, shareholder-based corporate governance model and toward multiple stakeholder models of corporate governance [e.g., Business and Society: A Strategic Approach to Corporate Citizenship, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA] and internal decision-making [e.g., Sloan Management Review 38, (1997) 25–37].