Victimisation and agency: the social construction of union women’s leadership

This article interrogates the notion that women union leaders lead differently. Despite significant variation in the union movements in Australia, Canada, Sweden, the UK and the USA, similar discourses on women’s union leadership emerge in all five countries. Based on a materialist social construction approach which supports a recognition of difference without reference to essentialist ideas about women’s nature, this article seeks to identify what may be common across these countries to explain this phenomenon. The article argues that the fact that women face discrimination in unions, on the one hand, and organise as a constituency and have access to women‐only education, on the other, supports the development of transformational leadership among women unionists, even across diverse contexts and cultures. Unpacking union women’s leadership practices in this way reveals a dialectic of victimisation and agency.     

Cultural influences on the design of incentive systems: The case of East Asia

Arguing that culture moderates the potency of various incentives in motivating employees, we propose a culture-contingent model of incentive system design in this article. Four nation-level determinants of culture are identified: historical events, economic/political structure, geographical location, and language characteristics. Based on evidence found in East Asia, specific propositions that either relate a national characteristic to some cultural attributes or predict how a cultural characteristic favours a particular type of incentive system are generated. The implications of this culture-contingent model for incentive system design in multinational firms are discussed.We would like to thank Donna Randall for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Are differences in firm size transitory or permanent?

An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From certainty to uncertainty: Thought, theory and action in a postmodern world

The progress of human thought in recent centuries has brought not only new knowledge but also new (and sometimes disturbing) questions that tug at the foundations of knowledge itself. The opening years of the twentieth century were marked by optimistic expectations of ever-increasing certainty and scientific and technological progress. Yet the century turned out to be an age of growing cracks in the facade of classical certainty, as relativity, quantum physics and chaos theory each deepened our understanding of the universe yet raised fundamental challenges to ideas about knowledge. Today, although reductionist and mechanistic ways of thinking still prevail in much contemporary thinking about economics, global security and environmental problems, we can nevertheless contemplate an “end of objectivity” in which we realize that we do not stand outside of the systems we study.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Recreation Demand and Residential Location

We use the properties of competitive location equilibrium to study the demand for recreation and the choice of primary residence location. Location-specific recreation and employment lead to pooling equilibria in which consumers reside according to their preference for recreation. In general, the stronger the taste for recreation, the greater the attraction of living close to the recreation site and the lower the demand for other goods, including housing. We explore the effects of trip frequency, trip length, and recreation cost on the spatial distribution of consumers. We also consider the effect of the wage rate on recreation and location demands.     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.