The inflation rates may accelerate after all: panel evidence from 19 OECD economies

The stationarity of inflation has many important economic implications. Most panel-based empirical studies do not handle cross-sectional dependence, which will result in power distortion. This paper applies a nonlinear IV estimator to calculate the test statistic of panel unit root (Chang in J Econom 110:261–292, 2002), which accounts for general cross-sectional correlation. Using monthly inflation rates, two statistics proposed by Im et al. (J Econom 115:53–74, 2003) reject the unit root; however, the nonlinear IV statistic accepts the unit root. That is, the ignored cross-sectional correlation may lead to over-rejection of the unit root null. In a nutshell, unlike current literature, the inflation rates may accelerate after all.     

A comprehensive German business cycle chronology

Business cycle chronologies offer reference points for empirical studies used as benchmarks for business cycle and recession theory. A quasi-official chronology exists for the US economy, but not for most European countries, including Germany. While most papers dealing with business cycle dates rely on one specific method, I present and discuss a number of different dating approaches based on the classical business cycle. These are applied to German GDP data comprising 1970–2006. Finally, based on the results of the different methods, a consensus business cycle chronology for the German economy is suggested.     

Teaching the Implicit Assumptions Underlying Firm Behavior in the Neoclassical Model

The neoclassical model imposes narrow assumptions on firm behavior and in the process hides implicit assumptions regarding the behavior of individuals. Although the firm is a complicated organization composed of many individuals, the neoclassical model simplifies its behavior to one objective—the maximization of profits. This assumption implicitly assumes that individuals within the firm subordinate their own self-interest for the firm’s benefit. A classroom activity is described which assists students in discerning whether the assumption of profit maximization fits reality.     

Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.     

Spatial patterns of biodiversity conservation in a multiregional general equilibrium model

Migration dynamics and local biodiversity are interrelated in a way that is likely to affect patterns of regional specialisation. We assess this relationship with a New Economic Geography model that has been extended with biodiversity. Biodiversity is heterogeneous, and responds to habitat availability. The results indicate that a symmetric pattern of regional specialisation is more likely, and that additional equilibria may emerge as the marginal utility of biodiversity increases. In the policy analysis we focus on the case where the overall social optimum is symmetric and show that it can be supported as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. However, multiple Nash equilibria may exist.     

Task assignment and organizational form

This paper shows that a firm prefers a process-based task assignment compared to a function-based one if the tasks are from functional areas which are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We consider several projects (processes) with contributions from several functional areas. The organization can be structured along processes like product lines (M-form) or along functional areas like marketing or production (U-form). The U-form enables cost savings due to specialization or scale economies. The more effective incentives under the M-form might outweigh these savings if the functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable.      

The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor δ*. In addition, δ* is often used as an intuitive measure for the stability of a tacit cartel, assuming that a collusive equilibrium is more difficult to sustain when δ* increases. However, according to standard theory the distance δ − δ* between the actual and the critical discount factor does not matter for stability as long as δ > δ*. This paper contributes experimental evidence that supports the intuitive idea that a larger critical discount factor makes collusion a less likely outcome.      

Fair welfare maximization

We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations. The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an a priori evaluation of any given feasible resource allocation. The fairness ratio for an allocation provides a bound on the discrepancy between this allocation and any other feasible allocation with respect to a large class of social welfare functions. We provide a simple representation of the fairness ratio as well as a general method that can be used to directly determine optimal fair allocations. For general convex environments, we provide a fundamental lower bound for the optimal fairness ratio and show that as the population size increases, the optimal fairness ratio decreases at most logarithmically in what we call the “inhomogeneity” of the problem. Our method yields a unique and “balanced” fair optimum for an important class of problems with linear budget constraints.     

Monetary policy and multiple equilibria with constrained investment and externalities

This paper focuses on two mechanisms under which interest-rate feed-back rules induce local indeterminacy in a closed economy with capital accumulation: arbitrage activity and the pricing channel. It shows that constrained investment, in the sense that it requires liquidity or that adjustment to the stock of capital is costly, is enough to induce indeterminacy if monetary policy follows a strictly passive interest rate rule. Determinacy of equilibrium is ensured under an active monetary policy stance. These results change when production externalities are introduced into the model so as to mimic the pricing channel in New Keynesian models. In this case, a policy stance that ensures determinacy is either active or strictly passive. In view of the contradicting results for the passive stance and the similar results for the active stance it is recommended that central banks act according to the active stance.