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161.
This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. We document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer-takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under-performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post-takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers. 相似文献
162.
ANAT R. ADMATI PETER M. DEMARZO MARTIN F. HELLWIG PAUL PFLEIDERER 《The Journal of Finance》2018,73(1):145-198
Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations. 相似文献
163.
We introduce the class of linear‐rational term structure models in which the state price density is modeled such that bond prices become linear‐rational functions of the factors. This class is highly tractable with several distinct advantages: (i) ensures nonnegative interest rates, (ii) easily accommodates unspanned factors affecting volatility and risk premiums, and (iii) admits semi‐analytical solutions to swaptions. A parsimonious model specification within the linear‐rational class has a very good fit to both interest rate swaps and swaptions since 1997 and captures many features of term structure, volatility, and risk premium dynamics—including when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound. 相似文献
164.
Although there is general agreement on the importance of the consumer correspondence handling function, specific steps businesses can take to satisfy consumers are relatively unexplored empirically. This study examines 300 consumers’ responses to actual manufacturers' letters addressing complaints and compliments. The discussion focuses on understanding the components of consumer satisfaction to manufacturers'responses and provides suggestions to businesses to increase that satisfaction level. 相似文献
165.
This paper examines the effect of rate regulation on the management of the property-liability insurer loss reserve. The political cost hypothesis predicts that managers make accounting choices to reduce wealth transfers resulting from the regulatory process. Managers may under-state reserves to justify lower rates to regulators. Alternatively, managers may have an incentive to report loss inflating discretionary reserves to reduce the cost of regulatory rate suppression. We find insurers over-state reserves in the presence of stringent rate regulation. Investigating the impact along the conditional reserve error distribution, we discover that a majority of the response occurs from under-reserving firms under-reserving less because of stringent rate regulation. 相似文献
166.
167.
STEPHEN G. HALL ZACHARIAS PSARADAKIS MARTIN SOLA 《Journal of Applied Econometrics》1997,12(2):151-168
In this paper we examine a model of cointegration where long-run parameters are subject to switching between several different cointegrating regimes. These shifts are allowed to be governed by the outcome of an unobserved Markov chain with unknown transition probabilities. We illustrate this approach using Japanese data on consumption and disposable income, and find that the data favour a Markov-switching long-run relationship over a standard temporally stable formulation. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
168.
In this paper, we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian's (1994) voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought. 相似文献
169.
The fact that raising taxes can increase taxed labor supply through income effects is frequently and erroneously used to justify greater public good provision than indicated by traditional, compensated analyses. We develop a model including multiple public goods and taxes and derive measures of the marginal benefits of public goods and the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) using both compensated and uncompensated measures. We confirm that the desirability of tax‐financed public projects is independent of the method used. An important innovation is to show that the benefits of public goods must be adjusted by a benefit multiplier not previously seen in the literature if an uncompensated MCF is used. 相似文献
170.
We model the interaction between bank capital regulation and financial innovation. Innovation takes the form of structured finance, namely, pooling and tranching of assets and the creation of separate structures with different seniority, different risk, and different capital charges. Structured finance can improve welfare by manufacturing safer securities, saving on the capital that the structures with different seniority need to satisfy incentive constraints. The divergence between private and social interests in future profits motivates regulation. Regulation lowers profits and may induce banks to innovate to evade the regulation itself, even if this decreases welfare. 相似文献