Tightening the Fiscal and Monetary Controls

The Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) is a new departure in post-war policy-making. As David Smith's Briefing Paper shows the ideas behind it are well rooted in historical experience, but nevertheless it was inevitable that there would be a major element of trial and error in the early years of its use. The experience of 1980-81 however has produced some alarming results. The monetary limits have been drastically exceeded and the PSBR is likely to be far above the original target. There are two possible explanations. Either the control system is gravely defective or the government has deliberately followed the kind of short-term discretionary policies (and has indulged in the kind of ad hoc interventionism) which the strategy was expressly designed to avoid. We believe that both explanations are true. It is also probable that they reinforced each other. The first year of the strategy was likely to be the year of greatest strain. It involved a highly ambitious attempt to reduce inflation at a time when cost pressures from wages and higher energy prices were particularly strong. The strains rapidly revealed the defects in the control system. Since the government was alarmed at the short-term consequences of its policies, it chose to make a virtue of necessity and in effect suspended its commitment to the control of sterling M3. It is possible to look back at 1980 and to say that, in the event, the government's loss of control over its policies was justified as statesmanlike flexibility. But there always appear to be good reasons for sacrificing long-term objectives for short-term expediency. The MTFS was intended to avoid the chronic tendency to accept the easy option. It is essential that in 1981 the commitment to the MTFS should be re-established and that it should be reinforced, as appears to be necessary, by a system of indicators and controls to ensure that the errors of 1980 are not repeated. Otherwise there is a serious risk that the hard-won gains in the fight against inflation will be lost in the economic upturn. In the first part of this Viewpoint we examine what happened to fiscal and monetary policy in 1980 and discuss the general lines that policy should follow in 1981-82. We conclude that in order to get fiscal policy back on course the authorities should aim for a PSBR of £10 bn in 1981-82. In the second part we discuss in more detail the reasons why monetary policy went so badly astray in 1980, focusing particularly on the role of the Bank of England. We argue that just as ‘dirty floating’ (i.e. the pursuit of exchange rate objectives) may threaten the monetary targets, so ‘dirty monetarism’ (i.e. the pursuit of interest rate objectives) may prove an even greater threat. We conclude that the discretionary activities of the Bank of England contributed to the excessive monetary growth in 1980, and that it is necessary to ensure that in future the Bank should conduct its policy on a non-discretionary basis.     

THE EMERGENCE OF COPYING TECHNOLOGIES: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The past few decades have seen dramatic advancements in the technology of copying and the diffusion of copying technology to the general public. This paper surveys some of the recent academic literature dealing with this issue. We focus on (i) the effect of varying the extent of property rights enforcement by the government, and (ii) possible responses by producers of originals to consumers' ability to produce copies. The traditional view is that as the government increases property rights enforcement, there is a decrease in the social welfare loss due to underproduction and an increase in the social welfare loss due to under-utilization. In the first half of the paper, we show how the analyses contained in a number of recent studies throw doubt on this traditional viewpoint. In particular, varying the extent of property rights enforcement has effects that the traditional analysis ignores. As a result, the social welfare losses mentioned above can move in ways not recognized previously. The conclusion is that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, choosing an optimal level of property rights enforcement by the government should not be viewed as a simple trade-off between these two social welfare losses. In the second half of the paper, we discuss possible market responses to consumers' ability to produce copies. Among other responses, we consider the role of price discrimination and complementary products when copying is possible.     

CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION, U.S. MONEY DEMAND, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

A number of writers have argued in recent years that massive international currency substitution has been a major cause of exchange rate volatility and monetary instability in the United States and other major countries. Such analysis is frequently coupled with recommendations for a return to pegged exchange rates. This paper critically examines the evidence presented for this currency substitution view. It argues that the weight of latest research suggests that direct international currency substitution has not been of major quantitative importance for the U.S. However, empirical evidence supports traditional views that international capital mobility can generate substantial short-run monetary interdependence even under flexible exchange rates. Thus, even though international currency substitution is of little importance to U.S. monetary conditions, a broader range of international considerations may be of considerable importance for the U.S. economy.     

The Evolution of Security Designs

We consider a competitive and perfect financial market in which agents have heterogeneous cash flow valuations. Instead of assuming that agents are endowed with rational expectations, we model their behavior as the product of adaptive learning. Our results demonstrate that adaptive learning affects security design profoundly, with securities mispriced even in the long run and optimal designs trading off underpricing against intrinsic value maximization. The evolutionary dominant security design calls for issuing securities that engender large losses with a small but positive probability, but that otherwise produce stable payoffs, almost the exact opposite of the pure state claims that are optimal in the rational expectations framework.     

Financial Stress Regimes and the Macroeconomy

Some financial stress events lead to macroeconomic downturns, while others appear to be isolated to financial markets. We identify financial stress regimes using a model that explicitly links financial variables to macro‐economic outcomes. The stress regimes are identified using an unbalanced panel of financial variables with an embedded method for variable selection. Our identified stress regimes are associated with corporate credit tightening and with NBER recessions. An exogenous deterioration in our financial conditions index has strong negative effects in economic activity, and negative amplification effects on inflation in the stress regime. These results are obtained with a novel factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model with smooth‐transition regimes (FASTVAR).     

The Response of Equity Prices to Movements in Long‐Term Interest Rates Associated with Monetary Policy Statements: Before and After the Zero Lower Bound

Monetary policy actions since 2008 have influenced long‐term interest rates through forward guidance and quantitative easing. I propose a strategy to identify the comovement between interest rate and equity price movements induced by monetary policy when an observable representing policy changes is not available. A decline in long‐term interest rates induced by monetary policy statements has a larger positive effect on equity prices prior to 2009 than in the subsequent period. This change appears to reflect the impact of the zero lower bound on short‐term interest rates.     

Asymmetry,Complementarities, and State Dependence in Federal Reserve Forecasts

Forecasts are a central component of policymaking; the Federal Reserve's forecasts are published in a document called the Greenbook. Previous studies of the Greenbook's inflation forecasts have found them to be rationalizable but asymmetric if considering particular subperiods, for example, before and after the Volcker appointment. In these papers, forecasts are analyzed in isolation, assuming policymakers value them independently. We analyze the Greenbook forecasts in a framework in which the forecast errors for different variables are allowed to interact. We find that allowing the losses to interact makes the unemployment forecasts virtually symmetric, the output forecasts symmetric prior to the Volcker appointment, and the inflation forecasts symmetric after the onset of the Great Moderation.     

Houses as ATMs: Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic Uncertainty

Mortgage refinancing activity associated with extraction of home equity contains a strongly countercyclical component consistent with household demand for liquidity. We estimate a structural model of liquidity management featuring countercyclical idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty, long- and short-term mortgages, and realistic borrowing constraints. We empirically evaluate its predictions for households' choices of leverage, liquid assets, and mortgage refinancing using microlevel data. Taking the observed historical paths of house prices, aggregate income, and interest rates as given, the model accounts for many salient features in the evolution of balance sheets and consumption in the cross-section of households over 2001 to 2012.     

Stimulating Housing Markets

We study temporary fiscal stimulus designed to support distressed housing markets by inducing demand from buyers in the private market. Using difference-in-differences and regression kink research designs, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit increased home sales by 490,000 (9.8%), median home prices by $2,400 (1.1%) per standard deviation increase in program exposure, and the transition rate into homeownership by 53%. The policy response did not reverse immediately. Instead, demand comes from several years in the future: induced buyers were three years younger in 2009 than typical first-time buyers. The program's market-stabilizing benefits likely exceeded its direct stimulus effects.