Human resources outsourcing in Canadian organizations: An empirical analysis of the role of organizational characteristics,transaction costs and risks

The main objective of this study is to evaluate the influence of three classes of determinants using a sample of 271 Canadian Organizations, namely: (1) strategic and organizational characteristics; (2) transactional variables; and (3) risk factors on human resource outsourcing. Using an ordered probit statistical analysis, the results show that a strategic implication on the part of the human resources department, support from top managers, prior experience with outsourcing and extensive use of benchmarking in human resources management are positively related to the intensity of Human Resource Outsourcing (HRO). We found some support for the transaction-specific variables, most notably for the complexity and the specificity of transactions. Finally, the study reveals that human and business risks appear to be important drivers of a firm's decision to outsource.     

The Neglect of Monotone Comparative Statics Methods

Monotone methods enable comparative static analysis without the restrictive assumptions of the implicit-function theorem. Ease of use and flexibility in solving comparative static and game-theory problems have made monotone methods popular in the economics literature and in graduate courses, but they are still absent from undergraduate mathematical economics courses and textbooks. In this article, the authors illustrate the generality of monotone comparative statics relative to the implicit function approach. For example, to sign the effect of a discrete policy shift on a choice variable, the marginal returns will increase with the policy parameter. They also apply monotone methods in game theory settings. As mathematical economics courses and majors gain popularity, incorporating monotone methods into curriculum and textbooks would provide a modern treatment of comparative static analysis.     

The Welfare Effect of Advertising Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry

The welfare effect of advertisingrestrictions in the U.S. cigarette industry dependsupon the impact of advertising on consumer and producer surplus, the transfer to consumers for being exposed to utility-reducing advertising, and smoking externalities. We estimate a demand equation and a supply relation simultaneously and use the parameter estimates to generate predictions of the impact of advertising restrictions on social welfare. Our results show that advertising restrictions benefit producers by limiting competition and generating higher industry profits, and such restrictions lower social welfare if the external cost of cigarette smoking is sufficiently low.     

OLIGOPOLY GAMES AND THE COURNOT–BERTRAND MODEL: A SURVEY

Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot–Bertrand model. When the choice of strategic variable is endogenous, the established dominant strategy is output competition. A growing body of work demonstrates, however, that the Cournot–Bertrand outcome can be a subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries. Observations of real‐world markets consistent with Cournot–Bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications. We lay out the roots of the Cournot–Bertrand model and explore a number of model developments. We categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions. In particular, some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous. Altogether, this research identifies when Cournot–Bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions. We also review the Cournot–Bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics, industrial organization, labor, and public economics. We expect the literature to continue to expand in the future.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING AND STRATEGIC CHOICE: THE COURNOT‐BERTRAND MODEL

Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SHORT‐RUN SHIFTING OF A CORPORATE PROFITS TAX

Can the owners of a firm shift a corporate profits tax to consumers? Not in the short run if the tax is stated as a proportion of profits and the firm is a profit maximizer. But what if the firm wishes to pursue a strategy other than profit maximization, say revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint? Under such a condition the firm's reaction to a tax or tax increase might be a price rise that captures part of the foregone profits. We show that firms which operate at a point on their demand curve that differs from profit maximization have an incentive to raise price in response to the tax – and that high cost firms have a greater incentive to raise price than do low cost firms. Our empirical analysis of the US beer industry confirms this finding, and sheds light on the Krzyzaniak–Musgrave analysis of the 1960s which suggested that the corporation income tax produced significant short‐run shifting.     

The Dynamics of Industry Concentration for U.S. Micro and Macro Brewers

In this update we document the changes in industry concentration of macro and micro brewers in the U.S. brewing industry since 1970. Technological change and the continued success of Anheuser–Busch forced the macro brewers into a war-of-attrition game and contributed to rising concentration in the macro sector of the industry. Homogenization of the beer produced by macro brewers, changes in local demand conditions, and a more favorable regulatory environment created profitable niches in many local markets for micro brewery beer, and entry into this sector occurred at a phenomenal rate from 1977 to 1998. Consistent with several models of industry dynamics, over-exuberance led to a shakeout as the number of micro breweries fell by over 16% from 1998 to 2002.     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.