In Defense of Deontology and Kant: A Reply to van Staveren

In this note, I respond to a recent article by Irene van Staveren (2007) in this journal, where she presents a case for virtue ethics, rather than deontology or consequentialism, as the most appropriate philosophical foundation for economics. Rather than taking issue with her positive arguments for virtue ethics, I argue in defense of deontology – or, more specifically, the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I argue that, when properly understood, Kantian ethics should not be associated solely with formal rules and obligation, but that Kant's moral system can accommodate many of the concerns of virtue ethics, such as social relations, real-world context, and human fallibility, as well as embodying a unique emphasis on human dignity and judgment.     

Starvation and Social Class: Amartya Sen on Markets and Famines

In his recent work, Amartya Sen assesses markets positively because they contribute to freedom. His work on famines, however, harbours a critical stance toward markets. In this paper, I compare Sen's ‘two views’ of markets and argue that his positive assessment is untenable. Markets can undermine freedom and, to show this, I examine the effects of market-dependence in times of famine; I extend the purview of Sen's analysis to include the manner in which subsistence producers who were once relatively autonomous from markets for their survival become dependent on markets. In conclusion, I examine the normative aspects of Sen's work on famines.     

Mending the family tree a reconciliation of the linearization and levels schools of AGE modelling

This paper offers a critical comparison between the North American levels school of applied general equilibrium modelling, and the Norwegian/Australian school of linearizers. The paper develops both the levels and linearized representations of a neoclassical multiregion trade model. This is used as a vehicle for focusing attention on similarities and differences between the two schools. The main conclusions are: (i) that both the levels and linearized versions of non-linear AGE model offer a valid starting point for obtaining accurate solutions to the non-linear equilibrium problem; (ii) when update formulae are not employed, linearized representations are particularly prone to erroneous welfare conclusions; (iii) the levels representation offers a more natural starting point for expressing accounting conditions, whereas behavioural relationships are relatively more easily expressed in a linearized representation. Recent software developments now make both approaches to the representation and solution of non-linear AGE models convenient to implement. Thus the choice of which approach to use will depend on the special needs and preferences of the economist implementing the model. The two traditions of AGE modelling have a great deal in common and both would benefit from greater cooperation.     

A political economy model of road pricing

In this paper, we use a simple majority voting model to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls. The model allows for different types of uncertainty and considers different uses of the toll revenues. The following results are obtained. First, we show that individual uncertainty with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority votes against road pricing ex ante, although a majority would have been in favor after its introduction ex post. Moreover, if a majority is against road pricing ex ante, there will also be no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty. Second, political uncertainty with respect to the use of the revenues corroborates the finding that ex ante more voters will be against the introduction of tolls. Third, both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are redistributed to all voters. Importantly, the results of this paper are consistent with a number of recent empirical observations on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road pricing in referenda, the more favorable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction, and tying the toll revenues to support public transport.     

Counting angels: a comparison of personnel and HR specialists

This article uses data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey to explore the extent to which the characteristics and job‐related activities of specialists who use the title 'human resources' differ from those who use the title 'personnel'. The results demonstrate that specialists using the HR title are better qualified than those using the personnel title and they are more involved with strategic planning. Additionally, employee development is more likely to be included in strategic plans, and there is slightly greater evidence of devolution of responsibility to supervisors where the specialist uses the HR rather than the personnel title. Finally, several practices commonly associated with HRM, such as personality tests, attitude surveys and off‐the‐job training, are more likely to have been adopted in workplaces that have an HR specialist than in those that have a personnel specialist.     

Class Formation and Localism in an Emerging Bureaucracy: British Bank Workers, 1880–1960

This article uses a case study of the spatial and career mobility of bank workers from Lloyds, a leading British bank, to explore the relationship between class formation and spatial mobility. The article argues against the idea that the large‐scale concentration and bureaucratization of the British banking industry in the early years of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a mobile middle‐class spiralist or cosmopolitan. We use archival data from Lloyds Bank to argue that the emergence of Lloyds as a large‐scale national bank involved a compromise with localized interests rather than a detachment of the bank from local concerns. We use data on the career histories of a representative sample of male bank employees to argue that spatial mobility was organized largely within regions and helped to consolidate the prospects of rural bank workers. We argue that London emerged as a distinctive ‘hub’ for banking careers, with significant amounts of movement to and from London from all regions. We therefore demonstrate how localized and rural cultures were sedimented within a large, national bureaucracy, and that a genuine ‘spiralist’ structure did not emerge. En s’appuyant sur une étude de cas relative à la mobilité géographique et professionnelle du personnel de la Lloyds, l’une des premières banques britanniques, cet article examine le lien entre la formation d’une classe et la mobilité spatiale. Il combat l’idée que la concentration et la bureaucratisation à grande échelle du secteur bancaire britannique au début du XXe siècle a fait na? tre une classe moyenne mobile en spirale ou cosmopolite. Les données d’archives de la Lloyds révèlent que son développement en tant que grande banque nationale s’est accompagné d’un compromis avec les intér? ts locaux plutôt que d’une indifférence à l’égard de ces préoccupations. Les informations sur les carrières d’un échantillon représentatif d’employés de banque masculins permettent d’établir que la mobilité géographique a été organisée largement au plan régional, contribuant à consolider les perspectives des employés en zone rurale. Londres est apparu comme un ‘pôle’ particulier dans les carrières bancaires, avec un nombre considérable de mutations vers et de la capitale à partir de toutes les régions. L’article montre ainsi comment des cultures locales et rurales se sont sédimentées au sein d’une importante bureaucratie nationale et qu’aucune structure ‘en spirale’ pure n’en est issue.     

A test for regulatory lag and the role played by periodic contract renewals in mitigating such lag in local cable franchise relationships

Summary and Conclusions This study reports two primary findings. First, the typical cable franchise relationship appears to be characterized by substantial regulatory lag. While long-term franchise contracts may involve a significant amount of day-to-day interpretation and modification, the interpretation and modification are not sufficient to ensure that the contractual terms of trade are consistently at market. In terms of pricing, channel capacity, community programming channels, and franchise fees, the terms of trade confronted by cities prior to franchise renewal are significantly less favorable than the terms of trade found in post-renewal contracts.Second, periodic franchise renewals appear to be a relatively effective means of mitigating regulatory lag and adjusting the contractual terms of trade to market. The terms of trade obtained by cities conferring renewal contracts are roughly, although not entirely, equivalent to the terms obtained by similarly situated cities concurrently issuing initial franchise awards.The conclusions to be drawn from these findings are twofold. First, the existence of regulatory lag in cable franchise relationships may be desirable. From a dynamic efficiency perspective, that is, regulatory lag may provide the regulated firm with an appropriate incentive to undertake risks, reduce costs, and/or improve productivity (Vogelsang 1988). In addition, because most of the capital assets associated with a cable system have economic lives of 10 to 15 years (Webb 1983), it may be inefficient to continually attempt to adjust the terms of trade in a franchise relationship to market (Schmalensee 1979).Second, while continuous regulatory oversight may have undesirable economic consequences, periodic contract renewals show promise as an effective means to ensure that regulatory authorities continue to promote the interests of a public utility's consumers. If designed perhaps to correspond to the points in time at which the public utility needs to rebuild or upgrade its plant, contract renewals may serve to push regulators to periodically examine whether the terms of trade offered by the public utility are at market. Without such encouragment, public utility commissioners may be content to sit back and do nothing (Joskow 1974, 298–299) so long as none of the actors in the regulatory process are complaining.     

Competition for versus on the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment*

European countries and Japan are contemplating more competition in passenger rail service. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Transport was assigned responsibility for making a recommendation to Parliament for choosing between competition for the rails and competition on the rails. The Ministry commissioned the experiments reported here to acquire better understanding of the properties of the alternative policies. Competition on the rails involves allocation of rights to use station and time‐slot routes by price bids in a combinatorial auction. Competition for the rails involves allocation of rights to regional monopolies by fare‐structure bids for supplying a prespecified minimum schedule.     

Distinguishing supplier reputation from trust in buyer-supplier relationships

We argue that a firm's reputation (i.e., central, enduring, and distinctive corporate associations held by individuals outside of an organization), although under-researched relative to trust, is more important than trust in impacting buyer-supplier relationships. Our conceptualization draws on theories and extant research related to transaction cost economics, information economics, and interfirm trust. The constructs of trust and reputation are distinguished and their relative impacts on relationship commitment and willingness to invest in the future of the relationship are examined. Suggestive empirical evidence is provided from a survey of industrial buyers, and implications and specific directions for future research are discussed.