The gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy)

The gambler’s fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler’s fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy fallacy can arise: the irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler’s fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler’s fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler’s fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler’s fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.     

Ownership and corporate wage policy: the signal and its strength

We argue that identification and proper specification of ownership links among firms is an important factor and is affecting firm performance on different dimensions. We focus on the corporate wage policy, where we show that firms with same stockholders have similar average labour costs after controlling for standard factors of the wage equation. Moreover, we propose new measures of stockholders’ ability to influence firms’ decision; signal and its strength. The signal measures stockholder’s preferences over a given corporate policy, while the strength function describes stockholder’s ability to influence a firms’ corporate policy.     

An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities affects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less co-operation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among authorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort compared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.The authors acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from Frank Jensen and Niels Vestergaard.     

A complex systems methodology to transition management

There is a general sense of urgency that major technological transitions are required for sustainable development. Such transitions are best perceived as involving multiple transition steps along a transition path. Due to the path dependent and irreversible nature of innovation in complex technologies, an initial transition step along some preferred path may cut off paths that later may turn out to be more desirable. For these reasons, initial transition steps should allow for future flexibility, where we define flexibility as robustness regarding changing evidence and changing preferences. We propose a technology assessment methodology based on rugged fitness landscapes, which identifies the flexibility of initial transition steps in complex technologies. We illustrate our methodology by an empirical application to 2,646 possible future car systems.

What really matters in attraction effect research: when choices have economic consequences

Researchers have recently strongly questioned the robustness of the attraction effect, according to which adding a decoy option to an existing choice set affects consumers’ choice behavior. Tying in with this debate, we identify the persistent use of hypothetical choices in the domain to be a major shortcoming in attraction effect research. In an experiment on the attraction effect with a realistic choice setting that fosters external validity, we manipulate the choice framing by contrasting hypothetical choices with binding choices that entail economic consequences. We find the attraction effect to be much stronger when decisions are binding, underlining the effect’s usefulness as a marketing tool.     

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. Results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that new entrants increase the incentives of RFMO members to leave and decrease the incentives of non-members to join it. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.     

Wage premium in the state sector and state‐owned enterprises: Econometric evidence from a transition country in times of austerity

This paper investigates the differences in the wage premium and compliance with the wage cut introduced in Serbia at the end of 2014, between two subsectors of the public sector: the state sector and state‐owned enterprises. Results show that before the austerity measures were introduced, the conditional wage premium was, on average, higher in state‐owned enterprises than in the state sector, with significant differences from the median to the top of the wage distribution. After the austerity measures were introduced, the wage differences between the subsectors deepened, due to lower compliance of state‐owned enterprises with the wage cut.     

Measuring new product and service portfolio advantage

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - The current study introduces the concept of new product and service portfolio (NPSP) advantage by creating and validating a three-dimensional...