A note on interactions-driven business cycles

Within the standard Keynesian multiplier framework, extended by a micro-model of interactive formation of individual consumption propensities, we demonstrate that socioeconomic interactions can lead to cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. The underlying micro-model of direct interactions is a version of Alan Kirman’s generic opinion formation model, with an additional feedback effect from macroscopic variables on the transition probabilities. Our model engenders cyclical fluctuations of economic variables, despite the fact that neither the Keynesian multiplier model nor Kirman’s model does so on its own.     

Measuring volatility with the realized range

Realized variance, being the summation of squared intra-day returns, has quickly gained popularity as a measure of daily volatility. Following Parkinson [1980. The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate of return. Journal of Business 53, 61–65] we replace each squared intra-day return by the high–low range for that period to create a novel and more efficient estimator called the realized range. In addition, we suggest a bias-correction procedure to account for the effects of microstructure frictions based upon scaling the realized range with the average level of the daily range. Simulation experiments demonstrate that for plausible levels of non-trading and bid–ask bounce the realized range has a lower mean-squared error than the realized variance, including variants thereof that are robust to microstructure noise. Empirical analysis of the S&P500 index-futures and the S&P100 constituents confirms the potential of the realized range.     

Director expertise and co-option in industry superannuation funds?

This study examines whether independent directors who possess financial expertise and are independent from the CEO (i.e., non-co-opted) are associated with improved outcomes for industry superannuation funds. Our results highlight that independence alone is insufficient to improve fund outcomes. Instead, we find that only non-co-opted independent directors benefit fund members in terms of higher performance and lower fees. Moreover, we find that independent directors' financial expertise is not associated with fund performance and fees. Our study has implications for regulators and superannuation funds who are currently debating the need for one-third independent directors on the board of Australian superannuation funds.     

A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money

Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context. Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

Representation and Educational Background of European Economists in Top Journals of Economics

We assess the contribution of European authors to 10 topjournals of economics from 1980 to 1998. Despite efforts on the European Union and national levels topromote academic excellence, European authors still play a minor role in top journals. Examining the development overtime we find little evidence for an increasing share of European contributions. Particular attention has been paidto the educational background of European authors. There is still a segmentation of academic education alonglanguage barriers in continental Europe. However, a considerable proportion of European authors has received a PhD from the US.     

中国和印度不平衡发展的比较研究

本文考察了中国和印度近年来经济增长不平衡的情况,并分析了不平衡增长对不均等和贫困的影响。通过对家庭调查数据和官方加总数据的分析,本文发现增长存在不平衡——区域间、产业间和家庭层面上,这表明减贫工作进展不平衡,若增长更平衡,减贫效果可能更好;另外,收入不均等程度也在提高。本文探讨了增长不平衡及其应引起重视的原因。具体讨论围绕"有利的"和"不利的"不均等两个概念展开——不均等与不平衡增长对公平性以及长期增长与发展的有利或不利影响。我们认为,需要制定相关政策,保持有利的不均等——继续鼓励创新和投资,同时降低不利的不均等的程度,尤其是通过人力资本和农村基础设施投资,帮助贫困人口参与市场。