Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

A burgeoning literature in experimental studies of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism focuses on the ability of institutions that allow the monitoring, sanctioning, and/or rewarding of others to facilitate cooperation. In this paper rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The study finds that while some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed. The study also compares behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain. The expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition. Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions.     

Strongly stable networks

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a “top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous—depending on player labels.     

Managing micropolitical risk: A cross‐sector examination

This article stresses the need for today's multinational firms to adopt their own political risk‐assessment and risk‐mitigation strategies. A comparative study of the energy, financial, and automobile sectors illustrates the need for all companies in these sectors to undertake comprehensive risk‐assessment strategies. Risk‐assessment models established by leading multinationals like British Petroleum, Bank of America, and General Motors are examined as examples that other companies in these sectors can build upon. The consistent micropolitical risk variables then lead to a proposed practical framework for examining sector‐specific micropolitical risk. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

当代生产管理领域之学术成果回顾——由精敏到延迟战略

自从工业革命以来，生产典范历经一连串的移转过程，由大量生产逐步发展出大量客制化、精实生产、敏捷及最新的精敏等概念。这些概念中，又以20世纪末才出现的敏捷与精敏较少为人所知。本研究试图将敏捷与精敏的学术成果作较完整的回顾，以找出关于这两个概念的问题中，什么论点已经被回答，以及还有什么论点有待进一步的探索。此外，由于许多学者都指出，企业如果要达到敏捷与精敏，须通过延迟战略才能实现。因此本研究也试图回顾有关评估延迟战略之效益的研究，以对未来的研究发展提供方向。     

Marketed tax avoidance: an economic analysis∗

Recent years have witnessed the growth of mass-marketed tax avoidance schemes aimed at the middle (not top) of the income distribution, with significant implications for tax revenue. We examine the consequences for the structure of income tax, and for tax authority anti-avoidance efforts, of tax avoidance of this type. In a model that allows for both demand- and supply-side considerations, we find that: there is an endogenous threshold income below which taxpayers do not avoid, and above which they avoid maximally; the per-dollar price of tax avoidance is decreasing in income under progressive taxation; endogenous adjustments in the price of avoidance make supply less responsive to anti-avoidance activity than thought previously; and avoidance may drive a non-monotone relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. These findings suggest that new approaches to anti-avoidance, beyond legal enforcement, might be needed.     

Serial Nonparticipation in Repeated Discrete Choice Models

We consider alternative econometric strategies for addressing serial nonparticipation, that is, repeated choice of the same alternative or same type of alternative across a series of choice occasions, in data typically analyzed within the repeated discrete choice framework. Single and double hurdle variants of the repeated discrete choice model are developed and applied to choice experiment and multisite seasonal recreation demand data. Our results suggest that hurdle models can generate significant improvements in statistical fit and qualitatively different policy implications, particularly in choice experiment applications where the proper treatment of serial nonparticipation is relatively more ambiguous.     

Frequent issuers’ influence on long-run post-issuance returns

Prior studies conclude that firms’ equity underperforms following many individual sorts of external financing. These conclusions naturally raise significant questions about market efficiency and/or about the techniques used to measure long-run “abnormal returns.” Rather than concentrating on a single security type or issuance, we examine long-run performance following any and all sorts of security issuances. Initial financing events do not associate with underperformance; however, subsequent financings do. Our results suggest that negative post-issuance returns have nothing to do with the specific type of security issued, and everything to do with the number of types of securities issued.     

An examination of the effects of management earnings forecast form and explanations on financial analyst forecast revisions

Using a sample of 978 quarterly management earnings-per-share forecasts made during the period 1993 to 1999, we document that financial analyst revisions to management earnings forecasts are a function of management forecast form. More precise forecasts (measured three different ways) lead to greater revision of financial analyst consensus EPS forecasts for a given level of unexpected earnings as predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bayesian adjustment models. Also, consistent with our arguments, maximum forecasts are interpreted as bad news by analysts. Our results, while consistent with theory, are inconsistent with recent experimental studies which do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of management earnings forecast form on the association between unexpected earnings and financial analyst forecast revisions. We also re-examine Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough's (2004) finding that attributions used to explain management forecasts affect the reaction to the forecast using analyst data. Consistent with their findings using stock prices, the attribution presence (especially external attributions) increases financial analyst revisions pursuant to management forecasts.