On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

Property rights in conflict: wild berry-picking and the Nordic tradition of allemansrätt

Wild berries became a valuable export article in Sweden and Finland at the end of the nineteenth century. At the time, property rights over wild berries were not explicitly defined, and in both countries, proposals were made to subject the berries to the landowner. The proposals did not pass and wild berry-picking on another's land continued, as seen from today's perspective, to be available to everyone. This paper looks at the socioeconomic context of wild berry-picking, and asks whether the principle of allemansrätt – a Nordic tradition of public access to nature – played a role in why wild berries did not become private property. By focusing on the Finnish penal code debate of 1888 and the process of stabilising the property rights, the paper rejects the idea of continuity. It argues that (1) the traditional allemansrätt is debatable as a historical concept and shows how (2) the contingent political process created the conditions, and economic imagination the impetus, that wild berries were not privatised but turned into an open resource.     

Sensitivity of fiscal-policy effects to policy coordination and business cycle conditions

This paper deals with the problems of assessing the effects of fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. Here, we face wide cross-country differences in key fiscal parameters, some of which may also be vary over time (business cycle). Moreover, these effects may also depend on trade spillover effects and thus on the extent of policy coordination. Our empirical analyses make use of data for 15 EU countries, mainly for the period 1970–2011. The results clearly indicate that fiscal multipliers are not constant across countries and time, being much larger during economic recessions. By contrast, the policy coordination-effects appear to be more homogenous, although it turns out that small countries may benefit more from coordination.     

Uncovering procedural knowledge in craft,design, and technology education: a case of hands-on activities in electronics

Different knowledge types have their own specific features and tasks in the learning process. Procedural knowledge is used in craft and technology education when students solve problems individually and share their working knowledge with others. This study presents a detailed analysis of a one student’s learning process in technology education and the procedural knowledge used during learning tasks. Thus, procedural knowledge is mainly produced when acting, and includes students’ goal-directed actions related to the craft, design and technology processes and their learning content. These knowledge practices also include multiple interactions with teachers and other students. The findings show six different knowledge practices: observing, checking and asking, revising, guided representative action, self-directed representative action, and comprehended action. These knowledge practices actively relate to each other, and, in concert, they constitute chains of actions that constitute two different types of procedural knowledge: proactive knowledge and executive knowledge. We conclude by discussing how these knowledge practices can be used to develop our understanding of the teaching and learning of craft, design and technology.     

Are return seasonalities due to risk or mispricing?

Stocks tend to earn high or low returns relative to other stocks every year in the same month (Heston and Sadka, 2008). We show these seasonalities are balanced out by seasonal reversals: a stock that has a high expected return relative to other stocks in one month has a low expected return relative to other stocks in the other months. The seasonalities and seasonal reversals add up to zero over the calendar year, which is consistent with seasonalities being driven by temporary mispricing. Seasonal reversals are economically large and statistically highly significant, and they resemble, but are distinct from, long-term reversals.     

Word-Of-Mouth Communication and Community Enforcement

We study a repeated game where a seller, who has a short-term incentive to supply low quality, is periodically matched with a randomly selected buyer. Buyers observe only the outcomes of their neighbors' games and may receive signals from them. When the buyer population is large, the seller may sell high quality even when each buyer observes her action in any given period with an arbitrarily small probability. When networking among buyers is costly, low quality is always supplied with a positive probability. For this case, we characterize an equilibrium where the seller randomizes between high and low quality.     

The manipulation of closing prices

Before the introduction of a call auction at the close, the last minute of trading at the Paris Bourse was the most active of the whole day. Even though the bid–ask spread increased substantially, the probability of large and aggressive orders increased, as did price volatility. In addition, both the one-minute returns and the proportion of partially hidden orders increased. In this paper, we develop an agency-based model of closing price manipulation, which can account for these phenomena. In addition, we discuss the optimal closing price mechanism under manipulation.