Market presence, contestability, and the terms-of-trade effects of regional integration

This paper examines the impact of market presence and contestability on the price behavior of US exporters in Brazil’s market when MERCOSUR and MFN trade liberalization take place. Using detailed panel data on trade and tariff rates, we find that both the preferred supplier’s market presence and threat of entry lower (raise) the US price reaction to MFN (preferential) trade liberalization, with similar quantitative effects. Thus, presence in, or threat of entry into, partners’ markets implies lower optimal MFN tariffs, and regional agreements can have pro-competitive effects in contestable markets. We also examine the ‘symmetry’ hypothesis between the effect of tariffs and exchange rates.     

Accounting for the Cost of Central Support Services in UK Universities: A Note

A significant part of the total cost of a university is spent on central support services. Traditionally, this has been funded by top-slicing the various sources of income and, although universities do attempt to ascertain the 'full cost' of research and consultancy services for pricing purposes, this practice does not always extend to attempts to determine the 'full cost' of academic departments. This survey examines the extent to which universities rely on top-slicing to recover the cost of central support services or use alternative approaches such as cost allocation, or service level agreements, or internal market prices or even devolution, as far as possible, to faculties. Each of these alternative approaches has been a feature of attempts to achieve better control of, and value for money from, central support services in other parts of the public sector, and yet these have not been widely implemented in universities.     

Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition

Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal withholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.     

Market Structure and Return Volatility: Evidence from the Hong Kong Stock Market

There is no consensus about the cause for higher volatility at the market open than at the market close in the U.S. market. As an order–driven, nonspecialist market, the Hong Kong stock market provides a useful setting for an examination. If halt of trade were the major cause of higher open–to–open volatility, the open–to–open volatility in the Hong Kong market would be higher. However, this is not observed. The autocorrelation of the open–to–open return series also indicates that the temporary price deviation at the market opening is not significant. We view these findings as consistent with the specialist argument.     

Downside Risk and Investment Choice

This paper develops an optimal investment strategy for individuals concerned with avoiding the possibility of realizing returns below a predetermined target level within a prescribed period of time. Assuming a Brownian motion process, a model is developed which allows computation of the exact probability of failure. The algorithm and associated comparative statics with respect to the mean and standard deviation of returns, target return, time horizon, and risk-free rate of return are likely to have many useful practical applications.     

RUNNING COSTS CONTROL IN UK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

This article assesses a recent and significant addition to the UK Treasury's public spending control system – running costs control on central government departments'administrative expenditure and the associated indicative manpower plans. The background to its introduction is briefly assessed, followed by a discussion of the public arguments put forward by the Treasury for the introduction of the control regime and the less formally articulated rationale for it. A fourteen-point checklist of the salient elements of the system as it has evolved to date is presented. The article then draws some conclusions about the effects of the system. Although running costs may in some respects give departments greater autonomy, this is more than outweighed by the constraints governing the administration of the system and the 'strings'which the Treasury attaches to the elements of flexibility built into it. It is clear, however, that running costs controls are at an evolutionary stage and recent developments, such as three year'firm deals', may have far-reaching consequences for relationships between the departments and the Treasury, and for the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies.     

Employment Subsidy with Capital Mobility

Most models of tax competition assume full employment. Yet, actually one often observes that fiscal competition, particularly when it is aimed at attracting investment, is motivated by the concern of fighting unemployment and enhancing job creation. The present paper considers a multicountry model with capital mobility and unemployment. Fiscal policy has two opposing objectives: financing unemployment insurance and increasing employment. In each country there is a majority vote on this policy.
The purpose of the paper is to analyse how opening borders to capital flows modifies the median voter's choice of the employment subsidy. Assuming that capital and labour are complements, economic integration is shown to raise the employment subsidy with fixed wages. This agrees with intuition as a larger employment subsidy attracts more capital. However, when wages are set by labour unions economic integration can change the median voter's choice in either direction.