Public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labour and capital markets

This paper develops second-best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets. The model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject. Another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan; it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur.     

Schooling processes and educational outcomes in France

Quality & Quantity -     

The return of Malthus?: The global demographic future,2000–2050

The Western world, with its demographic explosion completed and increasing living standards, should not forget the warnings of Malthus. By 2001, at expected growth rates, the world is on track for 8000 million population by 2023, increasing the chance of global conflict, hardship and disorganization. A key issue for the developing world is that of government control v individual choice and whether, following the example of the socialist societies, feelings of national and community interest will be encouraged in attempts to reduce fertility levels.     

Natural hazards and deposit behavior at financial institutions: A note

There have been few studies of the effect of natural disasters upon either individual economic units or financial institutions. The present paper is concerned with the question of the evidence as to the deposit experience of financial institutions following a sizeable natural disaster. The deposit data we use consist of observations from seven individual savings and loan associations and eight commercial banks in four sizeable 1970s U.S. natural disasters. Basically, there is no evidence of a run. In most cases, there is a significant increase in deposits.     

Solving exchange rate puzzles with neither sticky prices nor trade costs

We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rates disconnect and forward bias puzzles are simultaneously resolved. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habit persistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits along the lines of the work of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. It offers a neo-classical explanation of the Meese–Rogoff puzzle and mimics the failure of fundamentals to explain nominal exchange rates in a linear setting. Finally, the model naturally generates the negative slope in the standard forward market regression.     

Is it the weather? Comment

This comment discusses some errors in a recent paper by Jacobsen and Marquering [Jacobsen, B., Marquering, W., 2008. Is it the weather? Journal of Banking and Finance 32 (4), 526–540], in which the authors challenge our previous finding that stock market returns exhibit seasonal patterns consistent with the influence of seasonal affective disorder on investor risk aversion. We find that we cannot replicate the authors’ findings, even after corresponding with them. Furthermore, we document several problems with their methodology, including misspecification of their economic model, misspecification of their econometric model, and use of inappropriate data. While we agree that seasonal affective disorder is not an explanation for all variation in equity markets, we do maintain that careful analysis leads to economically and statistically significant evidence of the effect we originally documented.     

Cartel dating

The begin and end dates of cartels are often ambiguous, despite competition authorities stating them with precision. The legally established infringement period(s) from documentary evidence need not coincide with the period(s) of actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but‐for prices and an underestimation of overcharges. Total overcharges based on comparing but‐for prices to actual prices are a (weak) underestimation of the true amount overcharged, irrespective of the type and size of the misdating. The bias in antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before‐during‐and‐after method with an empirical cartel dating procedure, which infers structural breaks of unknown number and dates that mark the actual begin and end dates of the collusive effects. Empirical findings in the European Sodium Chlorate cartel corroborate our theoretical results.