Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Strategic Environmental Standards, Wage Incomes and the Location of Polluting Firms

The purpose of this paper is tostudy how the choice of environmental standardsby governments is affected by the existence ofwage incomes when firms locations areendogenous. In developed countries labor isunionized, which allows positive wage incomesto arise. Thus, each government has incentivesto persuade firms to locate in its countrysince social welfare depends on suchincomes. But, as pollution damages theenvironment, each government will only try toattract polluting firms to thecountry, to obtain the wage incomes, whenthe valuation of environmental damage showsthat it is low.     

Wage and hour violations in urban labour markets: a comparison of Los Angeles,New York and Chicago

This article compares violations of minimum wage laws and other labour standards in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago. Los Angeles has the highest violation rates, due to such factors as its industrial composition and disproportionately large number of small establishments, as well as its vast unauthorised immigrant population. In addition, Los Angeles’ higher rates reflect the stricter legal standards in California. We conclude that, although stronger workplace laws and regulations are crucial, in the absence of effective enforcement, they may fail to prevent workplace violations.     

Heterogeneity in bank pricing policies: The Czech evidence

We estimate the pass-through from market interest rates to bank interest rates using heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques to address heterogeneity at the bank level in the Czech Republic. The results indicate heterogeneity in bank pricing in the short, but not in the long term. Mortgage rates and firm rates typically adjust to money market changes, but often less than fully in the long run. Large corporate loans have a smaller mark-up than small loans. Consumer rates have a high mark-up and do not exhibit a cointegration relationship with money market rates even in the long run. Next, we examine how bank characteristics determine the nature of interest rate pass-through in a cross-section of Czech banks. We find evidence for relationship lending, as banks with a stable pool of deposits smooth interest rates and require a higher spread as compensation. Large banks are not found to price their products less competitively. Greater credit risk increases vulnerability to money market shocks.     

Exploring The Gender Effect On Europeans’ Retirement Savings

This paper investigates whether European women have the same probability of saving for retirement as European men and if driving factors for this saving behavior differ by gender. The evidence is based on a sample of 6,036 individuals from eight European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The results show that European women are less likely to save for retirement than men, although the determinants of this decision are similar for both genders. Moreover, the results suggest that country-level institutional factors play a more important role on the individual's retirement attitudes than gender differences.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

The Value of Transferable Skills

Most studies on skill transferability focus on the return to capabilities developed in the initial job and disregard the different characteristics of the origin and the destination industries. In contrast, this article assesses the borders of skill transferability by comparing the return to skills for firm stayers, firm changers in the same industry, and firm changers to other industries. Based on a sample of Portuguese employees in retail banking, our results confirm significant inter‐firm and inter‐industry skill transferability. Difference‐in‐differences estimates with propensity score matching show that firm switchers benefit from a wage premium compared to firm stayers. However, the wage premium drops sharply when movers leave the banking sector.