Financial Development and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Six MENA Countries

This paper examines the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth for six Middle Eastern and North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia), within a quadvariate vector autoregressive framework. We employ four different measures of financial development and apply the augmented vector autoregression vector (VAR) methodology of Toda and Yamamoto to test for Granger causality. Our empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that finance leads to growth in five out of the six countries. Only in Israel could weak support be found for causality running from economic growth to financial development but no causality in the other direction. These findings suggest the need to accelerate the financial reforms that have been launched since the mid 1980s and to improve the efficiency of these countries’ financial systems to stimulate saving/investment and, consequently, long‐term economic growth.     

Punishment in environmental protection

The fundamental character of a punishment is the subject of this paper. Based on the assumed function of a punishment (deterrent), a punishment has to be perceived and experienced to be an adverse result by the punished and the public. The first factor in particular means that the courts have to have flexibility to sentence a person to such a punishment that is experienced as such. The legal question becomes how this customization of a punishment is acceptable from an equality standpoint. In the field of environmental protection, the administrative process poses serious problems. There may be administrative proceedings that result in substantial economic losses for individuals and groups alike. Jürgen S. Poesche was born in Edmonton (Alberta, Canada), lived in Europe and North America and graduated from the Helsinki University of Technology, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration and Tampere University of Technology. Areas of interest include chemical and mechanical pulping, environmental protection (EIA, environmental ethics, environmental law), and capital investment decision-making. He has published in, e.g., Wochenblatt für Papierfabrikation, Finnish Journal of Business Economics, Ympäristojuridiikka (Environmental Law), and in the publication series of the Helsinki University of Technology and the Tampere University of Technology. Presently, he is working for a major Canadian forest products company.     

A Technological and Organisational Explanation for the Size Distribution of Firms

This paper combines insights from the literature on the economics of organisation with traditional models of market structure to construct a theory of equilibrium firm size heterogeneity under the assumption of a homogenous product industry. It is possible that configurations consisting entirely of small firms (run by entrepreneurs with limited attention) and with larger firms (using managerial techniques to substitute away these limits to allow increasing returns technologies to become profitable) can arise in equilibrium. However, there also exist equilibrium configurations with the co-existence of large and small firms. The efficiency properties of these respective equilibria are discussed. Finally, the implications of an expanding market size are considered.     

Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States

Zusammenfassung Koordinierte Strategien für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten. - In diesem Aufsatz wird die dynamische Spieltheorie auf die Koordinierung der Politik zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der EWG in einem stark aggregierten Modell angewandt und folgendes gezeigt: (i) Eine Politik, die den Einflu\ von Ma\nahmen anderer L?nder vernachl?ssigt, führt in den USA zu Fiskalischen Einschr?nkungen und einer Verminderung der staatlichen Interventionen, in Europa dagegen zu einer Nachfragestimulierung, verbunden mit einer kontinuierlichen Herabsetzung des Diskontsatzes. Die EWG-L?nder sind, da sie ihre Politik nicht koordinieren, nach einigen Jahren wegen Zahlungsbilanzschwierigkeiten zu einer kontraktiven Nachfragepolitik gezwungen. (ii) Koordinierte Strategien best?tigen, da\ nicht-synchronisierte Politiken die Weltwirtschaft stabilisieren k?nnen. (in) Kooperation verbessert die wirtschaftlichen Leistungen, ausgedrückt in den Wachstumsraten und den Zahlungsbilanzen. Allerdings erbringt die ausdrückliche Zusammenarbeit kaum noch zus?tzliche Vorteile zu denen, die bereits im Rahmen der vollen Koordinierung erreicht werden k?nnen.

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Resumen Estrategias coordinadas de cooperación económica entre Europa y los EEUU.- La aplicación de un modelo dinámico de teoría de juegos a la coordinatión de política económica entre los EEUU y la CEE, como parte de un modelo altamente agregado de la economía mundial, permite concluír en este trabajo que (i) políticas que ignoran la influencia de medidas tomadas en otros países dan lugar a una contractión fiscal y a una menor interventión del Gobierno en los EEUU, pero a una estimulación de la demanda combinada con reducciones continuas de la tasa de descuento en Europa; al seguir políticas descoordinadas los países de la CEE están obligados a contraer la demanda agregada al cabo de unos a?os, debido a los problemas de balance de pagos, (ii) estrategias coordinadas confirman que políticas no sincronizadas pueden estabilizar la economía mundial; (iii) la cooperación favorece a la economía en términos de tasas de crecimiento y balance de pagos. Sin embargo, los beneficios adicionales de una cooperatión explícita resultan marginales en comparación con los beneficios ya alcanzados por la solución con coordinación total.

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Résumé Stratégies coordonnées pour la coopération entre l’Europe et les E.U. - En appliquant la théorie dynamique de jeu à la coordination de politique entre les E.U. et la CEE dans un modèle fortement agrégé de l’économie mondiale, cet article arrive aux conclusions suivants: (i) La politique qui ignore l’influence des actions suivies dans d’autres économies mène à la réduction fiscale et à moins interventions gouvernementales dans les E.U., mais à une stimulation de la demande avec des réductions continuelles du taux d’escompte en Europe. En cas d’une politique pas coordonnée les pays CEE sont forcés à prendre des mesures pour freiner la demande agrégée après quelques années à cause des problèmes de la balance des paiements. (ii) La stratégie coordonnée confirme que des politiques pas synchronisées pourraient stabiliser l’économie mondiale. (iii) La coopération peut élever le taux de croissance et améliorer la balance des paiements. Cependant, les gains additionnels d’une coopération explicite sont petits en comparaison avec les bénéfices déjà gagnés à l’aide d’une solution complètement coordonne’e.

     

Does direct foreign investment affect domestic credit constraints?

Firms in developing countries cite credit constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Direct foreign investment may ease credit constraints by bringing in scarce capital. Alternatively, if foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may crowd local firms out of domestic capital markets. Using firm data from the Ivory Coast, we test whether: (1) domestic firms are more credit constrained than foreign firms, and (2) whether borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates domestic firm credit constraints. Results provide support for both hypotheses. We also find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less financially constrained than other domestic enterprises.     

The impact of skewness in the hedging decision

The impact of skewness in the hedger's objective function is tested using a model of hedging derived from a third‐order Taylor Series approximation of expected utility. To determine the effect of price skewness upon hedging and speculation, analytical results are derived using an example of cotton storage. Findings suggest that when forward risk premiums and price skewness in the spot asset have opposite signs, speculation increases relative to the mean‐variance model. When the signs are identical, speculation will decrease, contradicting findings of mean‐variance models. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:503–520, 2006     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.