Co‐determination and strategic integration in German firms

Looking at the economic development and importance of German companies in Europe, one might expect that an important aspect of a good economic performance is a well‐functioning HR system. Although a number of scholars claim this, the empirical evidence seems to point to the opposite. Several comparative studies have found that HRM in German companies is less strategically integrated and proactive than that of comparable firms in other countries. This article argues that the empirical results reported fail to grasp the essence of HRM in German firms. This lacuna is partly due to the co‐determination structure. HRM in large German firms has to be evaluated within the co‐determination structure, with the Betriebsrat (works council) being an important actor. For German firms co‐determination might even be a strategic resource. By examining this issue within such a framework, a more favourable picture of HR integration in German firms emerges.     

CHALLENGES TO THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH*

Why do some new ventures succeed while others fail? What is the essence of entrepreneurship? Who is most likely to become a successful entrepreneur and why? How do entrepreneurs make decisions? What market, regulatory, and organizational environments foster the most successful entrepreneurial activities? Entrepreneurship research is plagued by these and other fundamental unanswered questions, for which there does not exist a cohesive explanatory, predictive, or normative theory. In this article we identify major challenges for entrepreneurship theory development, and offer insights into promising directions for future research. Our conclusion suggests that it may be too ambitious to expect a complete and robust theory due to the interdisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship. However, we show that by integrating perspectives and by applying analytic, empirical and experimental tools from a range of fields, some of the fundamental questions can be answered.     

Why do firms disclose knowledge and how does it matter?

In this paper we propose a simulation model aimed at describing the emergence and the dynamics of innovation networks, with particular emphasis on the role of open knowledge disclosure. It is argued that firms that widely disclose knowledge to other firms are more likely to enter innovation networks and to acquire a central position within these networks. By disclosing knowledge, firms increase their reputation, which indicates to other organizations that they are competent, and that it is worth starting a partnership with them. The higher a firm reputation, the higher its probability of entering new R&D partnerships with other firms. Our model provides, therefore, a rationale for behaviors of open knowledge disclosure by showing that such strategies, although risky in the short run, may pay in the long run by enabling firms to access external sources of knowledge more easily.     

State Pension Accounting Estimates and Strong Public Unions

Concerns are commonly raised that strong public unions extract generous pension benefits from state governments and are the cause of states' burdensome pension obligations. Prior research (Anzia and Moe 2015) finds evidence supporting such concerns. Consistent with incentives to minimize such perceptions, our findings suggest that state pension plans with stronger public unions select higher discount rates to improve reported funding levels. While riskier asset allocations are used to support the higher discount rates (which equal the expected return on the plan assets), most of the higher rates appear opportunistic. In addition, consistent with a desire to avoid drawing attention to persistent plan underfunding, our evidence indicates that stronger union plans are less likely to select longer amortization periods to recognize pension deficits when underfunding is larger. We do not, however, find evidence for asset smoothing periods being used to delay the recognition of investment losses on plan assets. Together, our findings suggest that stronger union plans take steps to make their pension obligations look less burdensome to the public.     

Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

We investigate the effects of heterogeneity and incomplete information on aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism. The non-linear laboratory environment has three-person groups as partners under varying conditions of information and communication. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian predict that increasing heterogeneity will have no effect on aggregate contributions in a no-communication environment. Ledyard conjectures a positive effect of incomplete information, a negative effect of heterogeneity, and a positive interaction of heterogeneity and incomplete information. We find that incomplete information has a small but significant negative effect. Heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (endowment and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (endowment or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian invariance result and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures.     

Consistent High-precision Volatility from High-frequency Data

Estimates of daily volatility are investigated. Realized volatility can be computed from returns observed over time intervals of different sizes. For simple statistical reasons, volatility estimators based on high-frequency returns have been proposed, but such estimators are found to be strongly biased as compared to volatilities of daily returns. This bias originates from microstructure effects in the price formation. For foreign exchange, the relevant microstructure effect is the incoherent price formation, which leads to a strong negative first-order autocorrelation ρ(1)≃40 per cent for tick-by-tick returns and to the volatility bias. On the basis of a simple theoretical model for foreign exchange data, the incoherent term can be filtered away from the tick-by-tick price series. With filtered prices, the daily volatility can be estimated using the information contained in high-frequency data, providing a high-precision measure of volatility at any time interval.
(J.E.L.: C13, C22, C81).     

Software piracy and outsourcing in two-sided markets

This paper examines the role of software piracy in digital platforms where a platform provider makes a decision of how much software to produce in-house and how much to outsource from a third-party software provider. Using a vertical differentiation model, we theoretically investigate how piracy influences the software outsourcing decision. We find that when piracy is intermediate, the loss in in-house software profits due to piracy outweighs the loss in licensing fee profits. As a result, an increase in piracy leads to more outsourcing. However, when piracy is high, it becomes too expensive for the platform provider to subsidize the software provider, resulting in a decrease in outsourcing. Moreover, when software variety is also endogenously chosen by firms, the platform provider’s incentive to develop software variety in-house depends not only on the return from software profits but also on the return from hardware profits. Under such a situation, an increase in piracy always leads to less outsourcing and less total software variety. To provide additional insights on the outsourcing decision, we conduct empirical analyses using data from the U.S. handheld video game market between 2004 and 2012. This market is a classical two-sided market, dominated by two handheld platforms (Nintendo DS and Sony PlayStation Portable) and is known to have suffered from software piracy significantly. Our regression results show that in this market, piracy increases outsourcing but has no effect on the total software variety.

     

Adoption patterns over time: a replication

Marketing Letters - Based on new data, we replicate Mahajan et al.’s (1990) paper on adopter categories and Goldenberg et al.’s (2002) paper on saddles and offer explanations and...     

Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach initiated by Guth and Yaari. It allows us to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two‐player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as well as asymmetric situations. We show how to apply solution concepts that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two examples.