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11.
With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members. 相似文献
12.
We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and strategic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates' positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe 1994) and apply Chwe's result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.Received: 18 May 2001, Accepted: 22 January 2002, JEL Classification:
C7, D7, D8Myrna H. Wooders: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/An earlier version of this paper was completed while the first author was visiting the Department of Economics, University of Exeter. The first author gratefully acknowledges Exeter's support and hospitality. Similarly, the second author gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium and of the University of Cergy-Pontoise, France. Both authors are indebted to Amrita Dhillon, John Duggan and Gilat Levy for helpful comments about references. Both authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
13.
Prompted by food shortages, the newly ensconced Ghanaian military regime in 1972 initiated ‘Operation Feed Yourself’, a national programme directed at increased production of food crops. The authors attempt to determine how effective Operation Feed Yourself has been in attaining its goals. The bureaucracy which was set in place to implement the programme is assessed. Building on personal interviews conducted in Ghana with persons responsible for and affected by it, the authors discuss the successes and shortcomings of Operation Feed Yourself and suggest areas in which improvement might be made. 相似文献
14.
The airline and luggage industries hold widely different views about which party should bear responsibility for checked luggage (baggage) damaged during transport. The problem is compounded by the fact that there currently is no uniformly accepted definition of or standards for airline compatible luggage. While much attention has been given to the carry-on baggage issue, many feel that the problems surrounding checked baggage are at the heart of the matter. This case study outlines the attempts of both industries to address the issue of performance standards for airline compatible luggage. 相似文献
15.
If bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs, a first‐ or second‐price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller’s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue. We show that if entry costs are heterogeneous and private information, then the revenue‐maximizing reserve price is above the seller’s value, a positive admission fee (and a reserve price equal to the seller’s value) generates more revenue, and an entry cap combined with an admission fee generates even more revenue. Social surplus and seller revenue may either increase or decrease in the number of bidders, but they coincide asymptotically. 相似文献
16.
17.
We introduce a no-risky-arbitrage price condition (NRAP) for asset market models allowing both unbounded short sales and externalities
such as trading volume. We then demonstrate that NRAP is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence
of externalities. Moreover, we show that if all risky arbitrages are utility increasing, then NRAP characterizes competitive
equilibrium in the presence of externalities.
We are indebted to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Page and Wooders are especially
grateful to CERMSEM and EUREQua for their support and hospitality which made possible our collaboration. 相似文献
18.
Auctions with a buy price 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
eBay and Yahoo allow sellers to list their auctions with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately.
On eBay, the buy-now option disappears once a bid is placed, while on Yahoo the buy-now option remains in effect throughout
the auction. We show that when bidders are risk averse, both types of auctions raise seller revenue for a wide range of buy
prices. The Yahoo format raises more revenue than the eBay format when bidders have either CARA or DARA. Bidders with DARA
prefer the eBay auction, while bidders with CARA are indifferent between the two.
Part of this work was completed while Reynolds was a visitor at Instituto de Analisys Economico in Barcelona and while Wooders
was a visitor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. We are grateful to these institutions for their hospitality. 相似文献
19.
This paper investigates equilibria associated with alternative income-distribution schemes in economies where firm formation is endogenous. The income realizable by a firm depends upon the membership of the firm. An entrepreneurial equilibrium, where agents form and/or join firms so as to maximize their individual incomes, has firm structures that maximize aggregate income but does not have good existence properties. Two alternative equilibrium concepts that have better existence properties than the entrepreneurial equilibrium but weaker optimality properties are considered. The results are applied to the debate on the optimality of average-income-per-worker maximization within a market-socialist firm. 相似文献
20.
A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarf's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition, it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point isminimallypartnered, meaning that no player requires any other player in particular to obtain his part of the core payoff.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71. 相似文献