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Paulo K. Monteiro Frank H. Page Jr. Myrna Holtz Wooders 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》1997,28(4):481-501
We present a counterexample to a theorem due to Chichilnisky (Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1993, 29, 189–207; American Economic Review, 1994, 84, 427–434). Chichilnisky's theorem states that her condition of limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with unbounded short sales. Our counterexample shows that the condition defined by Chichilnisky is not sufficient for existence of equilibrium. We also discuss difficulties in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–107). 相似文献
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We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, with a slightly stronger condition of nonsatiation than that required for existence of equilibrium and with a mild uniformity condition on arbitrage opportunities, we show that inconsequential arbitrage, the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation, and compactness of the set of utility possibilities are equivalent. Thus, when all equilibria are Pareto optimal — for example, when local nonsatiation holds — inconsequential arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of an equilibrium. By further strengthening our nonsatiation condition, we obtain a second welfare theorem for exchange economies allowing short sales.Finally, we compare inconsequential arbitrage to the conditions limiting arbitrage of Hart [Hart, O.D., 1974. J. Econ. Theory 9, 293–311], Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Econometrica 55, abs1403–1418], Dana et al. [Dana, R.A., Le Van, C., Magnien, F., 1999. J. Econ. Theory 87, 169–193] and Allouch [Allouch, N., 1999. Equilibrium and no market arbitrage. CERMSEM, Universite de Paris I]. For example, we show that the condition of Hart (translated to a general equilibrium setting) and the condition of werner are equivalent. We then show that the Hart/Werner conditions imply inconsequential arbitrage. To highlight the extent to which we extend Hart and Werner, we construct an example of an exchange economy in which inconsequential arbitrage holds (and is necessary and sufficient for existence), while the Hart/Werner conditions do not hold. 相似文献
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We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty -core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the -core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between -core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71. 相似文献
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Myrna Holtz Wooders 《Economic Theory》1997,9(1):115-127
Summary In a model of an economy with multiple public goods and differentiated crowding, it is shown that asymptotically the core has the equal treatment property and coincides with the equilibrium outcomes. It follows that all individuals of the same type in the same jurisdiction must pay the same Lindahl taxes and, with strict convexity of preferences, the same Lindahl prices. With only one private good, for sufficiently large economies we show (a) the equivalence of the core and the set of equilibrium outcomes and (b) the nonemptiness of approximate cores and their equivalence to the set of approximate equilibrium outcomes.The author is indebted to Vicky Barham, John Conley, Hideo Konishi, Julian Manning and Roma Jakiwczyk for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 相似文献
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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate byplain conversationprior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption ofindividualisticandindependentbehavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to becoordinatedandcorrelated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92. 相似文献
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Greg Leo Jian Lou Martin Van der Linden Yevgeniy Vorobeychik Myrna Wooders 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2021,23(5):822-857
We study iterated matching of soulmates (IMS), a recursive process of forming coalitions that are mutually preferred by members to any other coalition containing individuals as yet unmatched by this process. If all players can be matched this way, preferences are IMS-complete. A mechanism is a soulmate mechanism if it allows the formation of all soulmate coalitions. Our model follows Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, except reported preferences are strategic variables. We investigate the incentive and stability properties of soulmate mechanisms. In contrast to prior literature, we do not impose conditions that ensure IMS-completeness. A fundamental result is that, (1) any group of players who could change their reported preferences and mutually benefit does not contain any players who were matched as soulmates and reported their preferences truthfully. As corollaries, (2) for any IMS-complete profile, soulmate mechanisms have a truthful strong Nash equilibrium, and (3) as long as all players matched as soulmates report their preferences truthfully, there is no incentive for any to deviate. Moreover, (4) soulmate coalitions are invariant core coalitions—that is, any soulmate coalition will be a coalition in every outcome in the core. To accompany our theoretical results, we present real-world data analysis and simulations that highlight the prevalence of situations in which many, but not all, players can be matched as soulmates. In the Appendix we relate IMS to other well-known coalition formation processes. 相似文献
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We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9. 相似文献