Verbraucherpolitische Probleme bei der Anwendung des Gesetzes zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGBG). Zugleich eine Würdigung neu erschienener Erläuterungsliteratur

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag untersucht den Schutzzweck des neuen AGB-Gesetzes anhand der Entstehungsgeschichte des Gesetzes. Er weist darauf hin, daß in der neuen Kommentarliteratur der verbraucherpolitische Schutzzweck nur unzureichend reflektiert wird. Dies zeigt sich insbesondere an der Auslegung des gesetzlichen Zentralbegriffs der »Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingung« und an seiner Ausnahme, den »im einzelnen ausgehandelten« Bedingungen. Hier ist nach Meinung des Autors eine Differenzierung in Geschäftsbedingungen zwischen Unternehmen einerseits und im Verhältnis Unternehmen-Verbraucher (Nichtkaufleute) andererseits erforderlich. Schließlich wird auf Probleme der Verbandsklage eingegangen.

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On the difficulties of protecting the consumer by means of the new german law on standard terms of contract (ABGB)

The paper analyses the attempts made in this Law to increase the protection of the consumer against unfair contract clauses. It reviews recent legal writings which have tried to evaluate the substance and scope of the protection provided by the Law. It is maintained that in these writings, the aims of the legislation are not examined at sufficient depth. Criticism is levelled especially against the way in which the concept standard contract term has been expounded.The author argues that standard contract terms have to be given different interpretations depending upon whether contracts are made between an enterprise and consumers or between two enterprises. In the first case (enterprise-consumer) a wide definition of standard contract terms should be applied in order for the courts to be able to deal with most consumer contracts. In particular, the author opposes the notion of individually negotiated contracts in Art. 1 § 2, which by literal interpretation would provide loopholes enabling enterprises to evade the law. In the second case (enterprise-enterprise), one should pay attention to the distribution of market power; the more powerful an enterprise in relation to the contract partner, the greater the need for legal control of contract terms.The paper also contains a commentary on the legal procedure of collective action (Verbandsklage) whereby consumer organizations can protest against unfair standard form contracts; some first practical experiences with the procedure are mentioned.

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Norbert Reich ist Professor für Rechtswissenschaft an der Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik, 2000 Hamburg 13, Von-Melle-Park 9.     

Child Health and Economic Crisis in Peru

The effect of macroeconomic crises on child health is a topicof great policy importance. This article analyzes the impactof a profound crisis in Peru on infant mortality. It finds anincrease of about 2.5 percentage points in the infant mortalityrate for children born during the crisis of the late 1980s,which implies that about 17,000 more children died than wouldhave in the absence of the crisis. Accounting for the precisesource of the increase in infant mortality is difficult, butit appears that the collapse in public and private expenditureson health played an important role.     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.