Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

Estimating the effectiveness of extension information systems using farm trials and subjective probabilities

A method of combining survey data and Dairy Herd Improvement Association (DHIA) records to achieve low cost farm trials is presented. Farm trials and surveys of current practices and production responses are useful to identify yield gaps between expectations predicted from experimental findings and actual field results. Different management schemes can be ranked using subjective probabilities and stochastic dominance to enhance successful implementation of research findings and to increase the feedback between researchers, extension workers, and producers. A survey of current masitis control practices and expected milk yield response is the example. Combining survey results with DHIA records allowed estimating the relationship between somatic cell counts (SCC) and milk yield. Eliciting beliefs about the relationship between SCC and milk yield showed that producers agreed with predictions from the statistical model. Subjective probabilities about SCC and mastitis control practices showed that our sample of experts and producers consistently ranked the different practices but extension agents had no consensus about the the most or least effective ones.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.     

Introducing Time‐to‐Educate in a Job‐Search Model

Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market. At the same time, education is a time‐consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by means of job‐search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on‐the‐job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a time‐consuming process, a concept which we call time‐to‐educate, during which an individual faces the trade‐off between continuing education and taking up a job.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Comparative Advantage in Demand: Experimental Evidence of Preferences for Genetically Modified Food in the United States and European Union

The United States (US) exports more than US$6 billion in agricultural commodities to the European Union(EU) each year, but one issue carries the potential to diminish this trade: use of biotechnology in food production. The EU has adopted more stringent policies towards biotechnology than the US. Understanding differences in European and American policies towards genetically modified (GM) foods requires a greater understanding of consumers’ attitudes and preferences. This paper reports results from the first large‐scale, cross‐Atlantic study to analyse consumer demand for genetically modified food in a non‐hypothetical market environment. We strongly reject the frequent if convenient assumption in trade theory that consumer preferences are identical across countries: the median level of compensation demanded by English and French consumers to consume a GM food is found to be more than twice that in any of the US locations. Results have important implications for trade theory, which typically focuses on differences in specialization, comparative advantage and factor endowments across countries, and for on‐going trade disputes at the World Trade Organization.     

Predicting the budgetary funding need of education in the three-year budget for 2008–2010

The paper presents a technique developed by the authors, which makes it possible to determine the necessary amount of financing for education at all the budget system levels for 2008-2010, based on the Russian average value of financing, taking into account the budget expenditures index for two variants of student population, i.e. the actual number of on-budget students and the number of students required to meet the economy’s need for trained workers. The technique was developed and the calculations were made on the basis of Russian long-term forecasts and the Russian three-year federal budget for 2008–2010.