Whistleblowing: a critical philosophical analysis of the component moral decisions of the act and some new perspectives on its moral significance

Discussions of whistleblowing whether in academic literature or in more popular media have tended to very one‐sided assessments of the moral worth of the act. Indeed, much of the current literature concentrates on psychological or managerial aspects of whistleblowing while taking for granted this or that moral position or eschewing any normative commitment on the question. The purpose of this article is firstly to reemphasise the importance and complexity of the normative foundations of whistleblowing acts; and secondly, through a moral philosophical analysis of the component decisions that make up any act of whistleblowing, to contribute to a more balanced and less polarised treatment of the topic. It is argued that the polarisation of views on the topic is in part due to a failure to decompose the act of whistleblowing into a number of inevitable component moral decisions leading up to the act. It is furthermore argued on the basis of the analysis that it is impossible to state a priori as a matter of general principle that whistleblowing is always morally right (a good act) or morally wrong (a bad act). The article will close with a reflection on the degree to which the weighing up of good and bad in the act of whistleblowing differs sharply among cultures; and with a conjecture as to a possible relation to a people's history which may serve as a pointer to interesting future empirical research on the topic.     

THE STRATEGIC PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF A TENDER

ABSTRACT ** :  A competitive tendering process within a public organization does not always render the anticipated results, i.e., the intended strategy is not always realized. This paper shows that the way the strategy process is managed by the parties involved in the tender is of importance to the outcome. Previous research has mainly focused on the situation ex ante the tendering process. This paper contributes to the research on competitive tendering by focusing on the management that takes place ex post the tendering process. For this purpose a theoretical framework consisting of a process-based approach on strategy formation is applied to the analysis of two case studies of competitive tendering in the Swedish water and sewage sector.     

Is Post‐War Economic Growth Exponential?

In this article, we argue that there are strong reasons for using linear instead of exponential models when analysing post‐war economic growth. Incorrect model specifications will lead to misinterpretations of the underlying economic reality and to erroneous economic forecasts. Our argument is based on an empirical investigation of real GDP per capita growth in 25 OECD countries (and three country aggregates) during the post‐war period using the Box‐Cox transformation method. The conclusion is that per capita growth is generally (more or less) linear (and definitely not exponential) for the level of economic development represented by these countries. Based on this we argue that analyses of growth should use linear instead of exponential models. This change of model could give new insights into problems connected with economic growth.     

WHAT DO AUDITORS DO? OBVIOUSLY THEY DO NOT SCRUTINISE THE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING

Auditors and auditing firms are important actors in the process of institutionalising accounting standards. However, the formal and institutional requirements to de facto ensure professionalism and independence in the Swedish municipal sector have been strongly questioned. The aim of this paper is to investigate and explain how deviations from accounting standards are treated and reported by auditors. The results indicate deficiency in both competence and independence among the auditors. The institutional arrangements in Sweden do not seem to ensure that auditors facilitate and support the implementation of accounting standards.     

Editorial Environmental regulations in the Swedish forest industry. What is the real problem?

The Swedish forest industry faces many regulations. In many cases they are used to eliminate, or diminish, negative external effects on the environment. The aims of most regulations are well accepted among decisions makers in the industry and in society. However, in many cases the implementation can present problems, the reason being bureaucracy.The Ortviken paper mill is located just north of Sundsvall, which is a middle-sized town in the northern part of Sweden. SCA, one of the world's largest forest companies, owns and operates the mill. In the beginning of the 1990s, Ortviken planned for an expansion, which was considered necessary for the company's strategy and potentially profitable. But in order to build a larger plant, SCA first needed a licence from the local authorities which showed that conditions laid down in the Law of Planning and Building were met. After that, the project needed approval by the environmental authorities according to their specific laws and requirements.SCA finally succeeded in getting all the permissions needed. But the whole process took more than 10 years, despite the fact that it was carried out in close co-operation with the local authorities.While waiting for the final approvals, SCA applied for permission to expand production without changing the present emission levels. The existing permit also included a ceiling on production since emissions usually are proportional to production. However, in this case SCA wanted to increase production by only 5 %, and emissions would not exceed allowed levels. But the application was refused. The company was not allowed to increase production above the existing ceiling without a completely new application to the environmental board. The processing time for such an application would cover about two years and cost an unknown amount of money.Recently, the same company decided to analyse the possibilities of expanding production at the Tunadal sawmill, which is located in the same area. One of the alternatives was to build a completely new mill with new technology at a new and suitable site. However, a pilot study showed that the handling time just for the local planning process would be seven years and cost around 10-15 million SEK (approximately 1.5 million Euro).In addition, two years would be required for the environmental approval, so that the whole process from planning to actual start of the investment would require about 10 years.These long handling periods are of course an effective obstacle to investment. No board of directors dares to decide on an investment costing hundreds of millions of Euro if the time span of uncertainty from decision to actual start of the factory is 10-15 years.Not only has the time span necessary to fulfil the new requirements caused problems. An enormous amount of detail is needed to fulfil the requirements of an environmental impact assessment for an investment. For instance, a temporary pile of soil requires a separate analysis of the consequences for the environment, and companies are required to specify the kind of fuel used in trucks that (an unspecified number of years ahead) will drive the garbage from the building site. All these problems are particular troublesome for heavy industries like the forest industry and other industries (e. g. the steel industry and the chemical industry) that deal with material processing.What this Swedish example shows is that it is perhaps not environmental regulation per se that can make an obstacle to industrial expansion. There is no problem for the Swedish forest industry in fulfilling the technical conditions on emission levels. The crucial factor is time. The example also shows that it is not the core content of environmental regulations that is troublesome, but how these regulations are handled and formulated. It is not the environment that is the enemy, but the bureaucracy around it.Sören WibeSLUDepartment of Forest EconomicsSE-90183 UmeåOla CarlénSLUDepartment of Forest EconomicsSE-90183 Umeå     

Management and Risk Characteristics of Part-Time and Full-Time Farmers in Norway

The objective of this exploratory study was to provide empirical insight into how different categories of farmers perceive and manage risk. The data originate from a questionnaire of dairy and crop farmers in Norway. The associations between part-time and full-time farming and farm and farmer characteristics, farmers' goals and future plans, risk perceptions, and risk management responses were examined with simple t - and chi-square tests, as well as with logistic regression. The results indicate that full-time and part-time farmers' goals, risk perceptions, and management strategies differ significantly. Policy makers and advisers should consider these differences when developing policies and recommendations for the different types of farmers.     

Diversification preferences in the theory of choice

Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper analyzes axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion.     

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

This paper considers two multi-item auction formats (ascending and sealed bid) which both identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of the investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.     

A trust game in loss domain

In standard trust games, no trust is the default, and trust generates a potential gain. We investigate a reframed trust game in which full trust is default and where no trust generates a loss. We find significantly lower levels of trust and trustworthiness in the loss domain when full trust is default than in the gain domain when no trust is default. As a consequence, trust is on average profitable in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. We also find that subjects respond more positively to higher trust in the loss domain than in the gain domain.     

Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents*

In some tournaments, it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Union members bargain over wage distribution, and some firms allow self‐managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labor. We analyze, and test experimentally, a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty, heterogeneity, and effort. We find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real‐effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions.