Harmonization of Accounting in France and Britain: Some Evidence

The European Community's accounting harmonization initiative is intended to create harmonized reporting by Community companies. If the Community's programme is successful, measurement practices in each member state should be such that the same transactions receive broadly comparable treatment irrespective of the country where the accounts are prepared. This study sets out to test whether this is the case in France and Britain and the application of the Fourth Directive, and whether in practice there is any consensus even within each jurisdiction. An empirical test for harmony and uniformity is made by asking accountants within each jurisdiction to compile financial statements from a common set of data.
The results of the test show that in this sample there is relatively little harmony within each national group, let alone between one jurisdiction and another.     

Why Option Prices Lag Stock Prices: A Trading-based Explanation

While many studies find that option prices lead stock prices, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that stocks lead options. We find no evidence that options, even deep out-of-the-money options, lead stocks. After confirming Stephan and Whaley's results, we show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options. We show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices. Hence, we find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

Briefing Paper

Between the end of 1979 and the end of 1981 unemployment rose by 1.4 million. After that exceptional period unemployment continued to rise rather less rapidly to its current level of 3.2 million, Of this 3.2 million, about 1.3 million have been unemployed for more than a year. In this Briefing Paper we describe and attempt to explain the processes by which long-term unemployment rose to its current level.
We also discuss two related questions; the first concerns the relationship between unemployment and vacancies and the second concerns the relationship between long-term unemployment and inflation. The final sections consider the policy implications of these findings.     

Measuring the Performance Drivers of a Pilot Implementation of a Purchasing Card System

Corporate purchasing cards have been offered as an efficient means of maintaining control over purchasing while reducing the administrative cost associated with the acquisition of low-dollar items. However, despite its growing popularity, there has been little systematic research on the use of this technology. This study uses archival data and a survey of users from a single large organisation to describe the nature of purchasing card technology and to investigate the consequences of its implementation. The card was found to be more positively accepted by younger, more committed employees who had shorter periods of tenure at the organisation studied, but who had received higher levels of supervisory encouragement, and who had more experience with credit cards.     

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

This paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. We apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one-shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives, both framed in a similar way. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games, aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable. The pure or mixed Nash equilibria cannot describe subjects' behaviour. We present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion. While previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given, we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well. The global-game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players, given the observed distribution of actions. We also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities.