Corruption’s impact on foreign portfolio investment

Corruption has significant effects on a nation’s financial markets through its adverse impact on foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Yet, the effects of corruption on FPI are nonlinear and reverse J-shaped, with intermediate levels of corruption yielding the most negative effects. Highly transparent nations, where a “level playing field” exists between foreign and local investors due to lack of information asymmetries related to corruption, attract the most foreign investment. However, at the margin, very corrupt countries attract more investment than moderately corrupt countries because a “perverse level playing field” in the former countries may put foreigners and locals on an even footing in terms of resolving asymmetric information problems. This nonlinear pattern is consistent with foreign investors’ desire to trade in markets where they are not at an informational disadvantage.     

Endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives

If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients,borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploitedvia high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct thisincentive problem by committing to share private informationwith other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by informationsharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks.But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage,their current profits are raised by the borrowers' higher effort.This trade-off determines the banks' willingness to share information.Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates,volume of lending, and social welfare.     

How have global financial institutions responded to the challenges of the post-crisis era?

The study examines the largely unexplored effect of changes in the competitive landscape for large, global financial institutions on their ability to take risks, as well as deploy capital and labour in an efficient manner based on a novel measure of inefficiency. The analysis shows during 2001–2013 that inefficiency peaked during the 2008 crisis period and has fallen back to levels close to pre-crisis periods. The model also performs well in out-of-sample forecasts of the financial firms’ future market values. These results suggest that large financial firms have been adjusting to the ‘new normal’ of the post-crisis period and thus are able to use capital and labour more efficiently within the constraints of current market conditions. In addition, a non-linear pattern between inefficiency and a firm’s asset size suggests that there might be an optimal scale for such firms in the $450–650 billion range.     

Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis

Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.     

Survival analysis software on MS/PC-DOS computers

There exist more than a dozen MS/PC-DOS programs with the capability of performing some form of survival analysis. Most of these are reviewed here, with respect to (1) the survival analysis methods they cover, (2) their ease of use and flexibility, (3) their user interface, (4) their graphics capabilities, and (5) their computational accuracy.     

Crises, Cronyism, and Credit

This paper examines the effects of several potential explanatory factors related to the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis. We find that a crisis can improve a poorly functioning credit system by making domestic lending rates more responsive to market-based returns. We report that the responsiveness of short-term lending rates is directly related to the level of transparency in the economy. Thus, countries with greater transparency (less corruption) are more likely to make credit decisions based on market-wide forces rather than succumb to the influence of special interest groups. Nations with greater transparency also experience significantly shorter and less severe economic downturns.     

Convergence and risk-return linkages across financial service firms

We examine the risk and return linkages across US commercial banks, securities firms, and life insurance companies during the 1991–2001 period. After controlling for changes in the broader stock market, interest rates, and foreign currency values, we find that return and risk interdependencies across these financial firms are significant and size-varying; larger institutions display stronger volatility transmission linkages, while smaller ones exhibit more prominent return-related linkages. The tighter link in risk among large financial institutions (FIs) suggests stronger convergence, employment of common models of risk measurement and risk management, and more intense inter-industry competition, particularly between large banks and large securities firms, compared to smaller institutions. Lack of risk spillover among smaller FIs confirms the intuition that they typically assume more localized and idiosyncratic risk. The co-movement of stock returns among smaller FIs has been helped by the effects of locally based factors, such as economic conditions and state regulations, on all such institutions, and a less diversified product set. Differences in spillover patterns between large and smaller institutions have implications on investment choices and mergers and acquisitions in the industry. Introduction of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) has had dissimilar effects on the riskiness of large versus smaller life insurance and securities firms, and an insignificant effect on commercial banks.