A New Application of Sustainable Growth: A Multi‐Dimensional Framework for Evaluating the Long Run Performance of Bank Mergers

Abstract:   We study the mergers of US publicly traded bank holding companies during 1987–2000 and find that the acquiring firm's sustainable growth rate is an important determinant of the cross‐sectional variation in the merged entity's long‐term operating and stock performance. The most economically significant determinants of the merged bank's abnormal stock return performance are the acquiring bank's estimated sustainable growth rate prior to the acquisition, as well as post‐acquisition changes in this growth rate, and the bank's dividend payout ratio. Our findings are robust even after controlling for several potentially confounding factors.     

Rating Agency Reputation,the Global Financial Crisis,and the Cost of Debt

Why do foreign firms obtain credit ratings by global rating agencies rather than from their home country's rating agencies even though global raters typically assign lower credit ratings when these foreign firms issue bonds in their home currencies? We find that bonds rated by a global agency decreased yields 11‐14 basis points (bps) when compared to those rated by Japanese rating agencies but, during the 2007‐2009 financial crisis, the yields on these Japanese bonds increased 12‐17 bps, thus fully negating the advantage of obtaining a bond rating from a global rater. This suggests that the reputation of global rating agencies declined during the 2007‐2009 crisis period.     

Nationalism, development and integration: the political economy of Ernest Gellner

In this paper, we show how in Gellner we can find a stimulatinganalysis of the institutional equilibria that characterise agrarianand industrial society and the conditions that make possibleinstitutional change from one equilibrium to another. This allowsa convincing account of the reasons why some countries industrialisedbefore others and why nationalism had such an uneven impacton the development of market economies. We consider the relationbetween Gellner's analysis and other theories of organisationand point out how Gellner can help to solve some paradoxes thatarise in these theories. We also argue that joining Gellner'scontribution to the analysis of the positional nature of statusand power reinforces his conclusion about the necessary stagnationof agrarian societies and the necessary (over)accumulation ofdifferent forms of capitalism. We conclude by examining theimplications of his analysis for the process of globalisationand its challenge to national states.     

IPO Underpricing and After-Market Liquidity

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) is generallyexplained with asymmetric information and risk. We complementthese traditional explanations with a new theory where investorsworry also about the after-market illiquidity that may resultfrom asymmetric information after the IPO. The less liquid theaftermarket is expected to be, and the less predictable itsliquidity, the larger will be the IPO underpricing. Our modelblends such liquidity concerns with adverse selection and riskas motives for underpricing. The model’s predictions aresupported by evidence for 337 British IPOs effected between1998 and 2000. Using various measures of liquidity, we findthat expected after-market liquidity and liquidity risk areimportant determinants of IPO underpricing.     

Specialists as risk managers: The competition between intermediated and non-intermediated markets

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).     

How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Precautionary Demand for Oil

We evaluate the macroeconomic effects of shocks specific to the oil market, which mainly reflect fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil driven by uncertainty about future supplies. A two‐stage identification procedure is used. First, daily changes in the futures–spot price spread proxy for precautionary demand shocks and the path of oil prices is estimated. This information is then exploited to restrict the oil price response in a vector autoregression. Impulse responses suggest that such shocks reduce output and raise prices. Historical decomposition shows that they contributed significantly to the US recessions in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, but not to the most recent slump. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Political Economy of Finance

The regulations that shape the design and operations of corporationsand credit and securities markets differ vastly from countryto country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequallyenforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfectunderstanding of why these international differences exist andof whether they tend to persist over time. However, a recentstrand of research has shown that some progress on these issuescan be made using the approach of the new political economy,which models regulation and its enforcement as the result ofthe balance of power between social and economic constituencies.In this paper we offer a first assessment of the results andpotential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance,banking, and securities markets.