The cotton weaving industry in European countries: Size of firm,static and dynamic efficiency

This paper is based on the results of a field work analysis of the cotton weaving industry, focusing on the relationships between performance, size and structure of firms. The results are utilized to compare models of the industries in the main European countries and to evaluate their competitiveness in the light of both standard and some non-standard efficiency criteria.     

On a simple characterisation of threshold graphs

In their very interesting paper “Set-packing problems and threshold graphs” [1] V. Chvatal and P. L. Hammer have shown that the constraints $$\begin{gathered} \sum\limits_{j = 1}^n {a_{ij} x_j \leqslant 1(i = 1,2, . . . , m)} \hfill \\ x_j \in (0,1)(j = 1,2, . . . , n) \hfill \\ \end{gathered} $$ are equivalent to the only inequality $$\begin{gathered} \sum\limits_{j - 1}^n {c_j x_j \leqslant d} \hfill \\ x_j \in (0,1)(j = 1,2, . . . , n) \hfill \\ \end{gathered} $$ if and only if the intersection graph associated with the matrix (a _ij ) — see § 1 — is a threshold graph i.e. a graph none of whose induced subgraphs are isomorphic to 2K ₂,P ₄,C ₄: As Chvatal and Hammer have shown [1], threshold graphs can be characterised in many different ways; the main result of this paper is to give a new, very simple characterisation which will enable us to test whether a graph is a threshold by a simple inspection of its incidence matrix.     

A Theory of the Distribution of Underpriced Initial Public Offers by Investment Banks

It is well documented that a firm may choose to offer underpriced securities in an initial public offer. An open question is why investment banks do not retain underpriced offers in their portfolio. We argue that the distribution of underpriced securities allows banks of high qualify to signal their value to their customers, promoting in this way their other product lines. We show that the total dollar value of underpriced securities distributed (rather than the percentage value) acts as the signal. We also find that, all else equal, larger customers and those with more elastic demand functions receive n larger total dollar value of underpricing.     

A tale of two Italies: ‘access-orders’ and the Italian regional divide

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the ‘access orders’ paradigm developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast [(2009). Violence and social order: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] to analyse the case of the Italian North–South economic divide. In line with their framework, we collect and discuss several social and political indicators over the long-run, at the regional level. Firstly we looked at data on the pre-conditions for the establishment of an open-access order, such as murders per capita (a proxy for control over violence), voting turnout and referendums participation (proxies for political legitimacy), and the impersonality of exchange. We then showed evidence of different access orders in the North and in the South, using the information on human capital formation, women participation in the labour market, and referendum results. On the basis of this evidence, we argue that, despite being part of the same State and subject to the same formal institutions, the North of the country progressively developed into an open-access order, while the South remained a form of limited access order.

Institutional differences are linked to specific aspects of the economic performance of the two areas, thus the ‘access order’ paradigm appears to be an effective conceptual scheme to explain the North–South economic divide.     

Italy in the Renaissance: a leading economy in the European context, 1350–1550

A well‐known debate on the Renaissance economy was held in this journal in 1962–4 between Roberto S. Lopez and Harry Miskimin on one hand and Carlo M. Cipolla on the other. More than half a century later, this topic can be reconsidered in the light of much wider information on the late medieval/early modern Italian economy. Using data on population, urbanization, prices, wages, and GDP, this article outlines the macroeconomic trends in central and northern Italy in the age of the Renaissance (1350–1550). The frequent plagues during the early Renaissance—that is, between 1348 and 1450—decimated the population, probably causing more deaths than in other European countries. Hence resources per worker increased and labour productivity, incomes, and standards of living improved remarkably. A favourable economic environment thus seems to have been a pre‐condition for the Renaissance in culture, art, and politics and the spread of new kinds of consumer demand. From the middle of the fifteenth century, living standards gradually worsened and eventually reached the low levels that had prevailed prior to the Renaissance.     

Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!

We study self‐selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high‐ability motivated (public‐fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high‐ability non‐motivated (market‐fit) politicians, and that high‐ability citizens, both public‐fit and market‐fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996–2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market‐fit and public‐fit parliamentarians. We also show that public‐fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market‐fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.