Should the Pre‐Notification of Mergers Be Compulsory in Australia?

Australia is unusual among the world's antitrust jurisdictions in not making the pre‐notification of mergers compulsory. However, if the parties are concerned that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is likely to object to the merger, there are strong incentives for them to notify the ACCC as the regulator has developed a strong reputation for imposing heavy costs on parties that fail to notify such mergers. The result is a system of quasi‐compulsory notification that creates the strongest incentives for parties to notify the ACCC of those proposals to which it is most likely to object. This study analyses data extracted from the ACCC's merger database and the empirical results are consistent with this characterisation. Mergers reported voluntarily by the parties are found to experience longer delays to completion, and are more likely to be challenged by the ACCC, when compared with a sample of all other mergers assessed by the regulator. The results suggest that non‐compulsory notification allows the parties themselves to pre‐sort the proposed merger vis‐à‐vis its interest to the ACCC.     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

Determinants of Current Account Imbalances in 16 OECD Countries: An Out-Of-Sample Perspective

We employ panel data as well as country-specific models to uncover empirically the determinants of current account imbalances. We find evidence of slope heterogeneity likely rendering the fixed-effect estimator inconsistent. Mean group estimation is followed to overcome the latter difficulty. Both estimation techniques are evaluated by means of in- and out-of-sample criteria. The mean group estimator outperforms the fixed-effect approach and, moreover, only three economic variables are found to impact on the current account balance significantly. These are the government budget balance, the domestic output gap and the changes of the terms of trade. We finally propose a parsimonious dynamic model of the current account, including only these variables and illustrate that it has similar predictive accuracy as country-specific benchmark models. JEL no. F32, C23, C53