E-Finance: An Introduction

E-finance is defined as “The provision of financial services and markets using electronic communication and computation”. In this paper we outline research issues related to e-finance that we believe set the stage for further work in this field. Three areas are focused on. These are the use of electronic payments systems, the operations of financial services firms and the operation of financial markets. A number of research issues are raised. For example, is the widespread use of paper-based checks efficient? Will the financial services industry be fundamentally changed by the advent of the Internet? Why have there been such large differences in changes to market microstructure across different financial markets?     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish Corporations

We study the short‐ and long‐term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra‐group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra‐group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra‐conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm.     

How Do Investors Regard ESOs?

All top‐50 and more than 80% of the top‐500 Australian listed companies now reward their executives with stock options (ESOs) of one kind or another.₁ We address the question: “Which method of accounting for ESOs — current practice, the US FASB's recommended practice or the AASB's preferred position — most closely reflects investors' pricing decisions?” We answer the question using models that relate a company's stock price to its earnings and book value of equity calculated according to these three choices of accounting treatment.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Employee Reload Options: Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise

Reload options, call options granting new options on exercise,are popularly used in compensation. Although the compound optionfeature may seem complicated, there is a distribution-free dominantpolicy of exercising reload options whenever they are in themoney. The optimal policy implies general formulas for numericalvaluation. Simpler formulas for valuation and hedging followfrom Black–Scholes assumptions with or without continuousdividends. Time vesting affects the optimal policy, but numericalresults indicate that it is nearly optimal to exercise in themoney whenever feasible. The results suggest that reload optionsproduce similar incentives as employee stock options and sharegrants.     

Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Discussion of “Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises”

Ertimur et al. (2003, this issue) study the difference in the market;s reaction to revenue versus expense surprises. The discussion first reviews their main findings and assesses the paper's potential contributions. Alternative explanations are then considered for the base-line result that the market reacts more to revenue surprises than to expense surprises. The hypothesized reasons for revenue surprises to matter more are critiqued, as are the tests of the hypotheses, and potential extensions that would link these test to financial statement analysis are suggested. Finally, two aspects of the assessment of how the reaction to revenue and expense surprises differs across value and growth firms are discussed: The definitions of value and growth firms and the potential benefits of assessing why analyst revenue forecasts are (not) observed for many value (growth) firms.     

Three New Real Estate Price Indices for Geneva,Switzerland

This paper develops constant-quality price indices for three categories of real estate-apartment buildings, vacant land, and condominiums—for the city of Geneva, Switzerland. We use both the hedonic and repeat sales models to estimate the price level and, in turn, the rate of price change. The general pattern of each series suggests that real estate prices in Geneva were fairly stable throughout the 1970s, increased sharply during the 1980s, but gave back some of these gains in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the sharp rise in prices in the second half of the 1980s is very similar to that found in some regions of the United States. We also consider the problem, implicit in the repeat sales method, of revisions in previously estimated price indices as additional data become available in later years.