A game-theoretic analysis of the Waterloo campaign and some comments on the analytic narrative project

The paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it provides what appears to be the first game-theoretic modeling of Napoléon’s last campaign, which ended dramatically on June 18, 1815, at Waterloo. It is specifically concerned with the decision Napoléon made on June 17, 1815, to detach part of his army and send it against the Prussians, whom he had defeated, though not destroyed, on June 16 at Ligny. Military strategists and historians agree that this decision was crucial but disagree about whether it was rational. Hypothesizing a zero-sum game between Napoléon and Blücher, and computing its solution, we show that dividing his army could have been a cautious strategy on Napoléon’s part, a conclusion which runs counter to the charges of misjudgment commonly heard since Clausewitz. On the other hand, the paper addresses some methodological issues relative to “analytic narratives”. Some political scientists and economists who are both formally and historically minded have proposed to explain historical events in terms of properly mathematical game-theoretic models. We liken the present study to this “analytic narrative” methodology, which we defend against some of objections that it has aroused. Generalizing beyond the Waterloo case, we argue that military campaigns provide an especially good opportunity for testing this new methodology.     

Harrodian and neoclassical paths in a constrained growth model

We provide a reformulation of disequilibrium growth theory, using the inverse optimum approach under rigidities. The long-run solutions are either Harrodian paths of warranted growth, with increasing unemployment, or inflationary long-run equilibria, with full employment.     

How to win a decision in a confederation

This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.     

Securitization, Insurance, and Reinsurance

This article considers strengths and weaknesses of reinsurance and securitization in managing insurable risks. Traditional reinsurance operates efficiently in managing relatively small, uncorrelated risks and in facilitating efficient information sharing between cedants and reinsurers. However, when the magnitude of potential losses and the correlation of risks increase, the efficiency of the reinsurance model breaks down, and the cost of capital may become uneconomical. At this juncture, securitization has a role to play by passing the risks along to broader capital markets. Securitization also serves as a complement for reinsurance in other ways such as facilitating regulatory arbitrage and collateralizing low-frequency risks.     

Vertical integration versus vertical separation: An equilibrium model

In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.This paper is a revision of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to thank my Senior Supervisor, Professor Thomas W. Ross, for his many helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Economic Association meetings in Kingston, June 1991. Helpful comments and suggestions were also received from Keith Acheson, Leigh Anderson, Jeffrey Church, Chantale Lacasse, Frank Mathewson, and Don McFetridge and two anonymous referees. I am responsible for any errors or omissions.     

The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK

The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analysed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signalling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high‐valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm. Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the UK over 1995–96.     

The “Lisbon Goal” of the EU: Rhetoric or Substance?

This paper explores the relationship between the rhetoric of the Lisbon Goal of the EU and key insights from trade theory and growth theory. It argues that the policy initiative as such is valid, but the paradigm of international competitiveness is potentially misleading. The focus should, instead, be on productivity. Industrial policies, while potentially valid against the backdrop of recent developments in growth theory, are subject to pitfalls in practice. Policies focusing on institutions are more promising. The paper offers a framework for discussing the role of different types of institutions with respect to the Lisbon Goal. This paper goes back to a joint presentation with Mario Nava at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna—40th Anniversary Symposium “A Changing Europe in a Changing World” June 24–25, 2004.     

When Preventing Absenteeism Fuels Long-Sickness Leave: The Case of a Leading Operator for Local Transport Services

We examine the strategy to reduce sickness absences of transit drivers in one of the leading Multinational Operators for Local Transport Services in France. Absenteeism dramatically rose as a result of this strategy. Using observations and interviews at the corporate and field levels, and company data, we disentangle the mechanisms that led to this failure. In a context of strong constraints especially from local communities, the strategy based on underlining the costs of absences pushed local units to change their management practices. They focused on chasing short absences, promoted presenteeism and intensified pressure on workers rather than boosting prevention. Eventually, long-duration sickness leaves massively expanded.