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31.
Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
32.
Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared. 相似文献
33.
A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms. 相似文献
34.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
35.
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37.
Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias. 相似文献
38.
The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win. 相似文献
39.
Richard?BaronEmail author Jacques?Durieu Hans?Haller Philippe?Solal 《Economic Theory》2004,23(2):445-454 (2004)
Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author. 相似文献
40.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献