The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formationand duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partnersin a joint venture to benefit from each other’s knowhow.Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity toacquire part of its partner’s knowhow. A party’sincreased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution ofthe joint venture. We characterize the conditions under whichdissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out itspartner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparativestatics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisitionfor the desirability of joint venture formation. (JEL code:G34)     

Intraday Value at Risk (IVaR) using tick-by-tick data with application to the Toronto Stock Exchange

This paper investigates the use of tick-by-tick data for intraday market risk measurement. We propose a method to compute an Intraday Value at Risk based on irregularly spaced high-frequency data and an intraday Monte Carlo simulation. A log-ACD–ARMA–EGARCH model is used to specify the joint density of the marked point process of durations and high-frequency returns. We apply our methodology to transaction data for three stocks actively traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Compared to traditional techniques applied to intraday data, our methodology has two main advantages. First, our risk measure has a higher informational content as it takes into account all observations. On the total risk measure, our method allows for distinguishing the effect of random trade durations from the effect of random returns, and for analyzing the interaction between these factors. Thus, we find that the information contained in the time between transactions is relevant to risk analysis, which is consistent with predictions from asymmetric-information models in the market microstructure literature. Second, once the model has been estimated, the IVaR can be computed by any trader for any time horizon based on the same information and with no need of sampling the data and estimating the model again when the horizon changes. Backtesting results show that our approach constitutes reliable means of measuring intraday risk for traders who are very active in the market.     

Coca Substitution and Free Trade in Bolivia: The Pending Crisis

This paper uses the factors proportion model of production and trade with ten inputs to analyze the potential impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) on the coca substitution program in Bolivia. With six crops including coca, the model produces comparative statics elasticities of changing prices on factor prices and output. Results show that the coca substitution program with free trade will result in large income redistribution in the coca‐producing region as a result of increased competition from larger and more efficient economies. Increased subsidies and institutional changes will be needed to sustain the coca substitution program in the long run.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform

It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the transition generation—that is, the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and, second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This article shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto improving. But it argues also that social security reform is more a pretext than a requirement for internalizing such a positive externality.