Strategic flexibility, rigidity and barriers to the development of absorptive capacity in business markets: Themes and research perspectives

The marketing and strategy literature hail strategic flexibility as a key success factor in creating continuously customer value and generating competitive advantage. However, empirical evidence indicates that rigidity in market strategies and actions is more the rule than the exception in organizations. The focus of this special issue is on better understanding rigidity and flexibility in business markets. This lead article seeks to elaborate on why companies face rigidity and how they can create flexibility. To do this, we relate rigidity in organizations to the concepts of dominant logic, industry recipe and persistence. The case illustrations highlight barriers to the development of absorptive capacity in business organizations. Identifying such barriers is a first step in better understanding how companies can remain agile and flexible in demanding and fast changing markets. The paper then proceeds with a brief introduction to the other contributions of this special issue and concludes with a research agenda.     

Marketmaking Middlemen

This article develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. There are two representative modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets: one is a middleman mode where an intermediary purchases inventory from the wholesale market and resells to buyers; the other is a market-making mode where an intermediary offers a platform for buyers and sellers to meet and trade. We show that a marketmaking middleman, who adopts a mixture of these two intermediation modes, can emerge in a directed search equilibrium and discuss implications for the market structure.     

MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.