Nominal vs real adjustment in demand for money functions

Recently, Fair (1987) has addressd an interesting question in the areas of demand for money, namely, whether the adjustment of actual to desired demand for money is in nominal or real terms. His conclusion, based on time-seies analysis for twenty-seven countries, including a few developing countries, was that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of the nominal hypothesis.

The aim of this paper is to address the same issue for eleven Asian countries. In the process, a reformulation of the test procedure used by Fair is suggested. In addition, the question is also examined within the framework of the error correction model. The models are also tested for structural stability.

The scheme of the paper is as follows. The models and the tests are specified in Section I. The data and the estimation issues are dealt with in Section II. Section III presents the results. The paper is concluded with a brief summary of the major findings.     

The quantity theory of money and its long-run implications

This paper examines three propositions implied by the quantity theory of money, namely, the neutrality hypothesis, the Fisher hypothesis and the monetary approach to exchange rate determination for six developed countries within a dynamic framework, which incorporates the long-run proposition as its steady-state solution while allowing for short-run deviation from the hypothesized long-run relationships to take place. The joint hypothesis that all three propositions are satisfied simultaneously is supported only for two countries.     

Queues with batch poisson arrivals and hyper-exponential service time distribution

Summary We consider in this paper the transient behaviour of the queuing system in which (i) the input, following a Poisson distribution, is in batches of variable numbers; (ii) queue discipline is ‘first come first served’, it being assumed that the batches are pre-ordered for service purposes; and (iii) service time distribution is hyper-exponential withn branches. The Laplace transform of the system size distribution is determined by applying the method of generating functions, introduced in queuing theory byBailey [1]. However, assuming steady state conditions to obtain, the problem is completely solved and it is shown that by suitably defining the traffic intensity factor,ϱ, the value,p ₀, of the probability of no delay, remains the same in this case of batch arrivals also as in the case of single arrivals. The Laplace transform of the waiting time distribution is also calculated in steady state case from which the mean waiting time may be calculated. Some of the known results are derived as particular cases.     

THE VALUE OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING BY ORGANIZATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES

We use a sample of international joint venture announcements to test the hypothesis that organizations learn from experience, such that prior learning enhances the value of later ventures. We find that experience with ventures in the same foreign location, as well as experience with international joint ventures in general, is valued by the market. In contrast, experience in the same type of joint venture activity does not add any incremental value. These findings suggest the market recognizes and values some, although not all, forms of organizational learning.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Let the evidence speak again! Financial incentives are more effective than we thought

In this essay, the authors rejoin the debate about financial incentive effectiveness. They (a) briefly review the state of the literature in 1998, (b) highlight new meta‐analytic findings and update conclusions regarding the financial incentives–performance relationship, (c) address the myth that financial incentives erode intrinsic motivation, (d) provide explanations for the presumed failure of financial incentives and (e) offer some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.