Exchange Rate Pass‐Through,Domestic Competition,and Inflation: Evidence from the 2005–08 Revaluation of the Renminbi

Import competition from China is pervasive in the sense that for many good categories, the competitive environment that U.S. firms face in these markets is strongly driven by the prices of Chinese imports, and so is their pricing decision. This paper quantifies the effect of the government‐controlled appreciation of the Chinese renminbi vis‐à‐vis the USD from 2005 to 2008 on the prices charged by U.S. domestic producers. In a panel spanning the period from 1994 to 2010 and including up to 519 manufacturing sectors, import price changes of Chinese goods pass into U.S. producer prices at an average rate of 0.7, while import price changes that can be traced back to exchange rate movements of other trade partners only have mild effects on U.S. prices. Further analysis points to the importance of trade integration, variable markups, and demand complementarities on the one side, and to the importance of imported intermediate goods on the other side as drivers of these patterns. Simulations incorporating these microeconomic findings reveal that a substantial revaluation of the renminbi would result in a pronounced increase in aggregate U.S. producer price inflation.     

Selling Failed Banks

The average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets. We document that failed banks are predominantly sold to bidders within the same county, with similar assets business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. Otherwise, they are acquired by less similar banks located further away. We interpret these facts within a model of auctions with budget constraints, in which poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness and ability to pay for failed banks. We document that this wedge drives misallocation, and partially explains the FDIC losses from failed bank sales.     

Equity Misvaluation and Default Options

We study whether default options are mispriced in equity values by employing a structural equity valuation model that explicitly takes into account the value of the option to default (or abandon the firm) and uses firm‐specific inputs. We implement our model on the entire cross section of stocks and identify both over‐ and underpriced equities. An investment strategy that buys undervalued stocks and shorts overvalued stocks generates an annual four‐factor alpha of about 11% for U.S. stocks. The model's performance is stronger for stocks with a higher value of the default option, such as distressed or highly volatile stocks.     

A classification of mergers and acquisitions by motives: Analysis of market responses*

Abstract. This study classifies mergers and acquisitions (M&A) into three target groups: (i) those that choose M&A as an alternative to bankruptcy, (ii) highly liquid target firms, and (iii) the remainder of M&A. Each of these categories yields different market responses: stockholders of bankrupt-predicted target firms have the lowest abnormal returns while stockholders of highly liquid targets have the highest. These results are consistent with the free-cash-flows hypothesis for M&A and are robust to possible confounding effects, such as size, method of payment, and whether the takeover is a merger or a tender offer. Résumé. Les auteurs classifient les fusions et les acquisitions selon trois groupes, savoir: i) les entreprises qui choisissent la fusion ou l'acquisition comme solution de rechange à la faillite, ii) le entreprises cibles qui ont un degré élevé de liquidité et iii) les autres cas de fusions et d'acquisitions. Chacun de ces groupes suscite des réactions différentes du marché: les actionnaires d'entreprises cibles dont la faillite est prévisible enregistrent les rendements anormaux les plus faibles tandis que les actionnaires des entreprises cibles ayant un degré élevé de liquidité enregistrent les rendements les plus élevés. Ces résultats sont conformes à l'hypothèse des flux monétaires libres relative aux fusions et aux acquisitions et résistent aux effets contradictoires possibles, tels que la taille, le mode de paiement et la nature de la prise de participation (fusion ou offre publique d'achat).     

POST‐MERGER PRODUCT REPOSITIONING*

This paper analyzes the effects of mergers between firms competing by simultaneously choosing price and location. Products combined by a merger are repositioned away from each other to reduce cannibalization, and non‐merging substitutes are, in response, repositioned between the merged products. This repositioning greatly reduces the merged firm's incentive to raise prices and thus substantially mitigates the anticompetitive effects of the merger. Computation of, and selection among, equilibria is done with a novel technique known as the stochastic response dynamic, which does not require the computation of first‐order conditions.     

Exchange Rate Pass-Through in a Competitive Model of Pricing-to-Market

This paper extends the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of quality pricing under perfect competition. Exporters sell goods of different qualities to consumers who have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Production is subject to decreasing returns to scale and, therefore, supply and the toughness of competition react to cost changes brought about by exchange rate fluctuations. First, we predict that exchange rate shocks are imperfectly passed through into prices. Second, prices of low-quality goods are more sensitive to exchange rate shocks than prices of high-quality goods. Third, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts toward higher quality and more expensive goods. We test these predictions using highly disaggregated price and quantity U.S. import data and find only weak empirical evidence in support of our theory.     

The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors

We examine the selection and termination of investment management firms by 3,400 plan sponsors between 1994 and 2003. Plan sponsors hire investment managers after large positive excess returns but this return-chasing behavior does not deliver positive excess returns thereafter. Investment managers are terminated for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to underperformance. Excess returns after terminations are typically indistinguishable from zero but in some cases positive. In a sample of round-trip firing and hiring decisions, we find that if plan sponsors had stayed with fired investment managers, their excess returns would be no different from those delivered by newly hired managers. We uncover significant variation in pre- and post-hiring and firing returns that is related to plan sponsor characteristics.     

The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement

We examine how open procurement data affect the competitiveness of award procedures and the execution of government contracts. The European Union recently made its historical procurement notices available for bulk download in a cohesive and user-friendly database. Comparing government contracts above and below EU procurement size thresholds, we find that, after the open data initiative, procurement officials are more likely to award treated contracts through open bidding. In cross-sectional analyses, we document variation in the open bidding effect consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (1) increased scrutiny by NGOs and investigative journalists and (2) learning by national procurement regulators. However, treated contracts are also more likely to experience costly modifications because the shift to open bidding introduces rigidity that limits officials’ discretion in selecting suppliers based on private information. Overall, our evidence indicates that open procurement data promote competitive bidding but lead to contracts with weaker execution performance. These inferences also hold in an alternative open data setting.