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71.
We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices. 相似文献
72.
Does stock market misvaluation affect business fixed investment? To answer this question, we provide evidence based on U.S. firm‐level panel data. We examine the orthogonality conditions for the investment Q and Euler equations, and our qualitative tests reject the null hypothesis that investment is unaffected by misvaluation (this result is not driven exclusively by the late 1990s). To measure the quantitative effects on investment, we introduce a measure of misvaluation into standard investment equations. Our estimates imply that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in misvaluation increases investment between 20% and 60% relative to the mean level of investment in the sample. 相似文献
73.
We employ extensive information on bank deposit rates and area migration patterns to examine pricing relationships implied by switching costs. We argue that, because of the trade‐off between attracting new customers and exploiting old ones, banks offer higher deposit rates in areas experiencing more in‐migration. Further, because greater out‐migration implies that a locked‐in customer will not be with the bank for as many periods, banks will offer lower deposit rates in areas exhibiting greater out‐migration. Also, because this effect of out‐migration logically depends on the extent of in‐migration, an interaction effect exists. We find evidence strongly supporting these relationships. 相似文献
74.
Elderly people in Britain, a substantial minority of some 18% of the total population, are not only market-place consumers but major users of social services. With reference to a recent investigation in the U.S., this paper looks at the British situation. Issues discussed include the limitations arising from relatively low incomes, advice opportunities and trends, and major problems in the supply of social services. 相似文献
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76.
ROBERT A. KAVESH 《The Journal of Finance》1991,46(3):1157-1166
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78.
ROBERT INNES 《The Journal of industrial economics》2006,54(3):369-395
We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant. 相似文献
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80.
In this paper we investigate a firm's decision to redact proprietary information from its material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants a firm's request to withhold information from investors in its material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread, reductions in market depth, and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the competitiveness of the firm's industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long‐term debt and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or experience losses. 相似文献