Entry restrictions and the determination of quality

Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. This paper analyzes demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of this type of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and the welfare of its consumers. Selective increases in the costs of entry such as licensing requirements and direct restrictions with competitive bidding for entry rights are considered. We analyze the effects of these policies on entry decisions and also the additional selection effects that are obtained when exit is allowed for and the rights to participate in an industry can be freely traded.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

Economies of Scale and Utilization: An Analysis of the Multi-Plant Generation Costs of the Electricity Commission of New South Wales, 1970/71–1984/85*

We examine the average costs of electricity generated in NSW at the site level employing a new simultaneous-equations model approach Further, we argue that costs depend principally on unit size and capacity utilization We reinterpret capacity utilization as a compositional variable which is a continuous proxy for the (inverse of) the intensity of demand for electricity, thus partially addressing the multi-product nature of electricity. Low capacity utilization corresponds to intense demands and hence peaking output We find that costs per kWh, as conventionally measured, are highly sensitive to the degree of capacity utilization but less so to unit size (scale). The results emphasize the need for tine-related pricing