Global financial crisis as a phenomenon of stock market overshooting

Inspired by Dornbusch’s model of exchange rate overshooting we develop a theory of stock market behaviour and its impact on the real economy. The idea is that stock market prices overshoot and undershoot their long-run equilibrium values which are determined by the development in the real economy. The overshooting is triggered primarily by a loose monetary policy. With our model we explain the genesis of the global financial crisis (GFC) 2008/2009 primarily as the result of a loose monetary policy in the USA. Following the overshooting and crash in the stock market the real economy dropped into a recession. After modelling the interaction of three markets with different speed of adjustment—money, stocks and goods—for a closed economy we expand it to an open economy and lastly study the spillovers of a financial market crisis between countries (from a large to a small country) by introducing the transmission channels of external trade or cross-border financial transactions. A long-lasting monetary easing as exhibiting by the Fed and the ECB since 2007 and 2008, respectively could—according to our model—generate another boom-bust cycle.     

Illustrating the importance of Austrian business cycle theory: A reply to Murphy,Barnett, and Block; A call for quantitative study

Murphy et al. (2009) criticize Young’s (2005) test of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) using US industry-level quarterly job reallocation data and the federal funds rate as a monetary policy indicator. I argue that not only are Murphy et al.’s specific criticisms misguided; more importantly, they all but completely rule out the type of empirical study that Young (2005) advocates: specifically, one that (1) is quantitative and distinguishes between statistical and economic significance and (2) attempts to exploit a hypothesis that is both a prediction of ABCT and not a prediction of competing monetary theories of the cycle. I argue that empirical studies embodying (1) and (2) are critical to ABCT as a research program. Furthermore, I review the existing econometric studies of ABCT from the last 10 years and conclude that there is much room for improvement along these lines.     

Specialists and citizens all: A reply to Boettke,Koppl, and Holcombe

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

Distinction or dichotomy: Rethinking the line between thymology and praxeology

The aim of this paper is to critically reexamine Ludwig Mises’ attempt to separate the psychological aspects of understanding (thymology) from the “science of action” (praxeology). There are, we contend, legitimate distinctions between theory, on the one hand, and, on the other, psychology or history. But, there is no need to dichotomize them from one another in the way Mises sometimes did.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses

We consider the problem of dividing a resource among a group of agents who have conflicting claims on it. We follow the axiomatic approach and investigate the class of rules satisfying claims-inequality and claims-order preservation in gains and losses. We show that these axioms single out the proportional rule when there are more than three agents. This result confirms the central role of this rule and furthers our understanding of it in claims problems.     

Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.     

A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences

We examine the properties of a two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model that allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem will hold in the steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points. We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple autarkic steady states, violations of the static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy if discount factors differ.     

Strategic approximations of discontinuous games

An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximationof an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the infinite game. We provide conditions under which infinite games admit strategic approximations.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).