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141.
Other-regarding preferences are important for establishing and maintaining cooperative outcomes. In this paper, we study how the formation of other-regarding preferences during childhood is related to parental background. Our subjects, aged 4–12 years, are classified into other-regarding types based on simple binary-choice dictator games. The main finding is that the children of parents with low education are less altruistic, more selfish, and more likely to be weakly spiteful. This link is robust to controlling for a rich set of children’s characteristics and class fixed effects. It also stands out against the overall development of preferences, as we find children to become more altruistic, less selfish, and less likely to be weakly spiteful with increasing age. The results, supported by a complementary analysis of World Values Survey data, suggest an important role of socialization in the formation of other-regarding preferences. 相似文献
142.
This paper analyzes how the use of endogenous direct advertising affects the functioning of a horizontally-differentiated market. We formulate a two-stage game of pricing and informative advertising in which two firms, first, compete with mass advertising and, later, build a database using their historical sales records and compete by directly targeting the ads on their potential customers. We show that, compared to the case where firms only use mass advertising, direct advertising yields higher advertising efforts and an intertemporal reallocation of both market power and profits from the first to the second period. We also find that targeting increases the overall firms’ profit and the level of social welfare, but the impact on the average intertemporal price and consumer surplus is ambiguous. Finally, when reaching the potential market with mass advertising is sufficiently expensive, the use of direct advertising leads firms to provide the socially optimal level of advertising whereas, if mass advertising is cheap, firms tend to launch too little advertising in the first period and too much in the second. 相似文献
143.
We show that every N-player K
1 × ... × K
N
game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least
zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.
We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry
of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges
support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology
and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.” 相似文献
144.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
145.
Joaquín Guzmán Cuevas Felipe Rafael Cáceres Carrasco 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(4):488-494
In the field of territorial economic growth, it is possible to identify important characteristics in the entrepreneurial structure,
such as the structure of the size of firms, main activity sectors, or the degree of innovation. However, other lesser known
characteristics are important also, such as functional dependency, which considers the relationship between small and medium
enterprises (SMEs), and suppliers and clients belonging to any territorial field or productive dependency, which considers
the level of concentration in terms of buying and selling in connection with the main suppliers and clients, respectively.
In order to empirically contrast the importance of these entrepreneurial characteristics and try to relate them with territorial
economic growth, a sample of 400 enterprises in the province of Seville (Spain) is used.
相似文献
146.
We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the
context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental
quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption.
We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor
countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption,
may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases
with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption
costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international
debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.
相似文献
147.
148.
Josefina L. Murillo-Luna Concepción Garcés-Ayerbe Pilar Rivera-Torres 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(1):35-46
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the strategic environmental behavior of firms and, more specifically,
the external and internal barriers that limit and sometimes even prevent the environmental adaptation. The analysis focuses
on a sample of industrial firms that have at least three workers and that are located in Aragón, a region situated in the
northeast of Spain. In order to achieve this objective, first the theoretical literature on the topic is reviewed. Subsequently,
from the firms which were sampled, the existence of an underlying structure among the totality of barriers is studied. Finally,
this structure is analyzed in order to determine if it has any influence on the degree of proactivity of the firm’s environmental
strategy.
相似文献
Pilar Rivera-TorresEmail: |
149.
In this paper, we empirically assess the importance of regional and sector-specific determinants of industry dynamics. To
this aim we test three hypotheses (originally proposed by Shapiro and Khemani (1987, Int J Indust Organ 5:15–26)) for the
relationship between the entry and exit of firms: independence, symmetry and simultaneity. Estimates from a panel data system
of equations seem to confirm the simultaneity hypothesis for Spain, i.e. we find evidence of a displacement (replacement)
effect between the gross rate of entry (exit) and the gross rate of exit (entry). Also, our results show that, irrespective
of the hypothesis we use, both sectorial and regional variables affect entry and exit.
相似文献
M. ManjónEmail: |
150.
Miguel-Ángel Galindo Martín Francisco Escribano Sotos María Teresa Méndez Picazo 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(2):214-221
The improvement of data statistics as well as the econometrician methods have facilitated the introduction the new variables
and factors I the economic growth analysis. In this sense, real variables have mainly been considered in the economic growth
studies, but not financial or risk management aspects. In this sense, it is interesting to analyze the relationship between
economic growth and value at risk and the feed-back process. The goal of the paper is to analyze the relationship between
economic growth and risk management and the feed-back process. We will consider economic variables, including economic growth,
rule of law, human capital, fiscal policy and monetary policy, among others, in our analysis. We will analyze the theoretical
relationships between these variables and risk and the effects of risk on economic growth. We will also develop an empirical
analysis considering the case of 15 European Union countries.
相似文献
María Teresa Méndez PicazoEmail: |