Revisiting managerial perspectives on dividend policy

We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends. The evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm value. Managers give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends, weak to little support for the tax-preference and agency cost explanations, and no support to the bird-in-the-hand explanation. The study provides new evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy. The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Maheshan Fernando and Sumeet Chawla for providing research assistance.     

Learning-by-doing and the sources of productivity growth: A dynamic model with application to U.S. agriculture

The significance of learning to productivity growth is formulated within a dynamic adjustment-cost framework. Explicitly treating the acquisition of knowledge as a firm-specific capital good entering the production function along with other conventional inputs, the dynamic optimization model integrates the learning-by-doing hypothesis with technical change, scale, and disequilibrium input use effects in the aggregate productivity analysis. The theoretical framework is applied to examining the dynamic components accounting for the growth of U.S. production agriculture over the 1950–82 period. The results imply a less important role for technical change and assign a substantial role to the previously unmeasured contribution of learning-by-doing to the growth of aggregate agriculture industry.The editor for this paper was Melvyn Fuss.     

Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices

Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.     

Air pollution-mortality models: A demonstration of the effects of random measurement error

Errors of measurement have long been recognized as a chronic problem in statistical analysis. Although there is a vast statistical literature of multiple regression models estimating the air pollution-mortality relationship, this problem has been largely ignored. It is well known that pollution measures contain error, but the consequences of this error for regression estimates is not known. We use Lave and Seskin's air pollution model to demonstrate the consequences of random measurement error. We assume a range of 0% to 50% of the variance of the pollution measures is due to error. We find large differences in the estimated effects on mortality of the pollution variables as well as the other explanatory variables once this measurement error is taken into account. These results cast doubt on the usual regression estimates of the mortality effects of air pollution. More generally our results demonstrate the consequences of random measurement error in the explanatory variable of a multiple regression analysis and the misleading conclusions that may result in policy research if this error is ignored.     

New Technology in Unionized Firms: Advantages of Mandatory Bargaining

U.S. Labor Law currently allows employers whose work forces are unionized to introduce new technologies without bargaining over the decision to do so. This forces unions to adopt inefficient strategies when negotiating collective bargaining agreements in an effort to minimize the impact of technological change on their members. Allowing unions to bargain over the decision to introduce new technologies would obviate their having to resort to these inefficient strategies. In addition, it might increase the likelihood of employees suggesting alterations in production processes that would increase the rate of technological change. For these reasons, this article advocates amending U.S. labor law to require employers to bargain over the introduction of new technologies.     

The generality/specificity issue in consumer innovativeness research

The purpose of the present study was to explore the role of personality in shaping consumer innovativeness by testing a model of the hierarchical relationships between a global (broad or abstract) personality trait, its domain-specific manifestation in a consumer context, and overt consumer behavior. A survey of 465 adult consumers measured global innovativeness, domain-specific innovativeness for two product categories (clothing and electronics) and self-reported purchase of new clothing and electronic items. Three hypotheses were tested. First, global innovativeness is more highly correlated with domain-specific innovativeness than it is with the purchase of new items. Second, domain-specific innovativeness is more highly correlated with the purchase of new items than is global innovativeness. Finally, the association between global innovativeness and new product purchase is mediated by domain-specific innovativeness. All three hypotheses were supported for both product categories.     

Structural instability of the core

Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q)= 2q-n+1 and let W be a smooth ‘policy space’ of dimension w. Let U(W)^N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an ‘instability dimension’ w^*(σ) with 2w^*(σ)w(n,q) such that:

1. (i) if ww^*(σ), and W has no boundary, then the core of σ is empty for a dense set of profiles in U(W)^N (i.e., almost always),

2. (ii) if ww^*(σ)+1, and W has a boundary, then the core of σ is empty, almost always,

3. (iii) if ww^*(σ)+1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always,

4. (iv) if ww^*(σ)+2 then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always.

The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of ‘pivotal’ coalitions of size 2q−n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non-empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q)+1.     

PROPRIETORIAL CONTROL IN FAMILY FIRMS: SOME FUNCTIONS OF 'QUASI-ORGANIC' MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategies of managerial control which are used by the proprietors of family-owned business enterprises. Interviews with the proprietors and senior managers of businesses in the building industry illustrate the ‘quasi-organic’ nature of management structures. These grant some autonomy to senior managers without threatening proprietorial decision-making prerogatives. Although the family firm has certain distinctive features, similar control strategies designed to ensure that delegated decisions are ‘reliable’ and ‘responsible’ are evident in various types of business enterprise. There is, then, scope for further comparative research within a conceptual framework which does not entirely divorce the family firm from other business organizations.