Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory

We argue that state-owned enterprise reform has failed in China, because incentive mechanisms that confront the key stakeholders did not elicit efficient behavior. Although incentive mechanisms were intended to elicit more effort, incentives became de facto improper because of a number of developments. This paper analyzes alternative sharing or incentive systems and highlights the interdependency among property rights, incentives, and enforcement. A common-property model is put forward to analyze recent reforms and to show that alternative property right assignments have complex and diverse configurations of positive and negative externalities. Incentive mechanisms that favor more equal distribution are the most inefficient, whereas those that differentiate among heterogeneous stakeholders based on effective, rather than actual, effort are more promising. An ideal arrangement that combines equal sharing and proportional effort is proposed.     

Combining Sources of Preference Data for Modeling Complex Decision Processes

We review current state-of-the-art practices for combining preference data from multiple sources and discuss future research possibilities. A central theme is that any one data source (e.g., a scanner panel source) is often insufficient to support tests of complex theories of choice and decision making. Hence, analysts may need to embrace a wider variety of data types and measurement tools than traditionally have been considered in applied decision making and choice research. We discuss the viability of preference-stationarity assumptions usually made when pooling data, as well as random-utility theory-based approaches for combining data sources. We also discuss types of models and data sources likely to be required to make inferences about and estimate models that describe choice dynamics. The latter discussion is speculative insofar as the body of literature on this topic is small.     

The Nature of Ethics Codes in Franchise Associations Around the Globe

The worldwide growth of franchising has been phenomenal during the past decade. At the same time there has been increased media attention to questionable business practices in franchising. Similar to some trade associations and professions, franchising has sought self-regulation by developing codes of conduct or ethics. This study examines the codes of ethics covering franchising activities in 21 countries. The results reveal that there is considerable variation in the activities/issues covered by the codes. Specifically, the codes cover most stages of the franchising relationship, focus on a narrow set of stakeholders, are short on ethical guidance, and offer few enforcement provisions. The implications of these findings for international franchising and research are discussed.     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

Modeling Mexican agricultural production

Results of time series tests (including unit root and deterministic and stochastic cointegration tests) imply that a mixture of differenced and cointegrated model specifications are warranted for econometric models of Mexican agricultural supplies and input demands. Test results are sensitive to choice of functional form and the set of regressors. For example, share equations should be estimated using differenced data, but output supply and input demand equations generally should not. Generalized Leontief and quadratic functional forms are preferred over the translog. Symmetry and curvature of a restricted profit function are rejected. Short-run output supplies and input demands are generally inelastic. First version received: February 1998/Final version received: November 1998     

Budget deficits, capital flows, and long-term interest rates: Cointegration findings for the united kingdom

This study uses cointegration tools to decide whether a long-term relationship exists between budget deficits and nominal long-term interest rates in the United Kingdom, as previous regression estimates have implicitly assumed. Based on maximum eigenvalue, trace, and likelihood ratio tests, as well as two cointegrating vectors, this study finds that a long-term positive relationship exists between the nominal 20-year government bond rate and the central government budget deficit.     

Determining market power exertion between buyers and sellers

Empirical techniques commonly used in industrial organization to measure market power exertion typically assume imperfectly competitive behaviour by firms on only one side of the market. Firms on the other side are assumed to be perfectly competitive. In this paper we extend traditional NEIO methods by developing a method to estimate market power exertion when firms on both sides have potential market power. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the model correctly estimates market power exercised by firms on either or both sides of a market and also correctly estimates firms' technology parameters. When applied to the US leaf tobacco market, findings indicate that cigarette manufacturers exert some monopsony power in purchasing leaf tobacco while producers, organized as a cartel, exhibit no countervailing monopoly market power. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Research on unionized grievance procedures: Management issues and recommendations

This paper critically reviews research on unionized grievance procedures to identify key issues for human resource/labor relations executives and to provide recommendations for dealing with these issues. The review covers psychological, sociological, economics, and industrial relations‐based research. Specifically, the authors recommend that senior human resource/labor relations executives and their staffs conceptualize the grievance procedure as a high involvement human resource practice, distinguish between the presence and use of grievance procedures, use grievance data to determine whether grievants or their supervisors suffer management reprisals, assess supervisors' dominant orientation toward employees, determine employee perceptions of grievance procedure fairness, and monitor the effects of work force composition and supervisor selection on grievance activity. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.