Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

Population growth and technological change in a global warming model

Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark “Business as Usual” (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.JEL Classification Q54, D99, O12This paper builds on the Woytinsky Lecture delivered by Roy Radner at the University of Michigan, March 11, 1998. We would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Arnulf Grubler, Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra, and Michael Toman for helpful discussions and references, and Andrew King, Charlotte V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of our previous expertise, it is even more important than usual to emphasize that we are responsible for all errors.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.     

Innovation generation in supply chain relationships: A conceptual model and research propositions

Innovation generation has increasingly been recognized as an outcome of interaction between a firm and various outside entities. According to this view, supplier involvement and alliances are routes to innovation generation. Despite this realization, there is a dearth of research, both conceptual and empirical, focusing on innovation generation in buyer-seller relationships in supply chains. In an attempt to fill this void, this article develops a conceptual model of innovation generation in buyer-seller relationships in upstream supply chains. The authors propose that innovation generation in supply chain relationships, both incremental and radical, is a consequence of interactions between buyers and sellers. They also delineate factors internal and external to the relationship that moderate the link between interaction and innovation generation. Finally, the authors discuss managerial implications of their research and offer guidelines for future empirical research. Subroto Roy (sroy@newhaven.edu) (Ph.D., University of Western Sydney, 2002) is an assistant professor of marketing and international business at the University of New Haven since 2001. Prior to his Ph.D., he had more than 12 years of experience in packaging industry (Tetra Pak) marketing and sales. Involved with several upstream industrial new product development projects he helped clients launch more than 100 brands. Current research interests include global supply chains, technology adoption, and knowledge outsourcing. His work has appeared inAmerican Marketing Association Educators Conferences and is forthcoming inIndustrial Marketing Management, among others. He is a co-guest editor of a special issue of theJournal of Business and Industrial Marketing and has consulted with leading companies in Australia and Asia. See http://www.newhaven.edu/faculty/roy. K. Sivakumar (k.sivakumar@lehigh.edu) (Ph.D., Syracuse University, 1992) is the Arthur Tauck Professor of International Marketing & Logistics and a professor of marketing at Lehigh University. His research interests include pricing, global marketing, innovation management, and supply/value chain management. His research has been published in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Marketing, theJournal of International Business Studies, Marketing Letters, theJournal of Business Research, International Marketing Review, Pricing Strategy & Practice: An International Journal, and other publications. He has won several awards for research. He is on the editorial board of six journals. Home page: www.lehigh.edu/~kasg. Ian F. Wilkinson (i.wilkinson@unsw.edu.au) is a professor in the School of Marketing at the University of New South Wales since 2001. His current research focuses on interfirm relations and networks in domestic and international markets and the dynamics and evolution of markets, including applications of complexity theory. His research has appeared in many journals including theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of World Business, theJournal of International Marketing, theEuropean Journal of Marketing, Industrial Marketing Management, theJournal of Industrial and Business Marketing, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. He is on the editorial board of 12 scholarly journals. See http://www.marketing.unsw.edu.au/PEOPLE/HTML/IWilkinson.html.     

The right to participate

A basic principle of democracy holds that all citizens have a right to participate in decisions that affect their personal interests, including decisions taken in the context of employment. Most industrialized, market economy democracies have created institutions to ensure that this right is effective. In North America, however, the right to participate in the making of critical employment decisions has not been secured, largely because of perverse, adversarial dynamics elicited by labor relations statutes. Universal, statutory participation via works councils is proposed as a means of making the right effective.     

Economic Analyses of Mergers at the FTC: The Cruise Ships Mergers Investigation

This paper provides an overview of how economists atthe Federal Trade Commission assess the potentialcompetitive effects of mergers, with a focus on thetypes of quantitative analyses frequently employed.The paper first outlines the general approach employedat the Federal Trade Commission to review mergers.The paper then describes analyses done in theinvestigation of proposed mergers in the cruiseline industry as a specific example. Of particularinterest in this example are the analyses used toassess the potential for coordinated interaction asa result of the merger.     

OK you are now an approved supplier—but you still do not get orders: Understanding the case of the P-Card

The purchase card (P-Card) was introduced in the 1990s as a payment mechanism for smaller value items so that purchase paperwork is reduced, itemized reporting and control become possible, and purchasing and payment are decentralized at the user level. Since the late 1990s, with E-procurement and B-to-B E-commerce, the possibilities of P-Card use have magnified exponentially. However, the adoption and success of P-Cards in organizations has been short of initial expectations.Using P-Cards with approved suppliers is an ideal situation for both buyers and sellers. In practice however, many P-Card users seem to buy many items from suppliers who are not on the approved supplier list. To make payments to these “new” suppliers, organizations need to make exceptions resulting in paperwork, costs, and loss of business for approved suppliers. However, there are many P-Card users who indeed follow the company-approved list and these users may be called “P-Card conforming users.”This article takes a knowledge-based approach and presents a model for conforming P-Card use (CPU). The model is tested in an organization, and results are used to derive managerial and research implications. While orientation training of P-Card users is important, both business marketers and purchasing departments need to reach out directly to the P-Card user to ensure that approved supplier lists work well in an electronic age.     

An Economic Analysis of the Effects on the World Dairy Sector of Extending Uruguay Round Agreement to 2005

A spatial equilibrium model of the world dairy sector is used to simulate the regional impacts of extending the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) dairy commitments to 2005. In particular, the import quota, within- and over-quota import tariff and export subsidy components of the URAA dairy commitments are analyzed both separately and jointly. This analysis provides insight into the tradeoffs among the various components of the URAA dairy trade liberalization. Extending the URAA to 2005 more than doubles the producer and consumer welfare impacts of the GATT 2000 relative to the BASE scenario for most regions. Aggregate producer and consumer welfare changes are estimated to be in the $2–5 billion range. Results suggest that western Europe remains heavily protected even after the URAA extension to 2005, and its dairy producers will lose the most with further, post-URAA dairy trade liberalization. In contrast, dairy producers in low-cost exporting regions (New Zealand, Australia and South America/South) will gain the most. Impacts of GATT 2005 on Japan, the U.S. and Canada are found to be relatively small. Un modèle àéquilibre spatial du secteur laitier mondial est utilisé pour simuler les impacts régionaux d'une reconduction des engagements laitiers de l'Accord sur l'agriculture de l'Uruguay Round (AAUR) de 1995 jusqu'à 2005. En particulier, nous analysons séparément et en interaction les contingents d'importation, les tarifs sur les importations faites à l'intérieur et au-delà des contingents et la section des engagements laitiers relative aux subventions des exportations. L'analyse jette un éclairage sur les compromis possibles parmi les divers éléments de la libéralisation préconisée par l'AAUR. Une reconduction de l'AAUR jusqu'en 2005 ferait plus que doubler les impacts sociaux du GATT 2000 sur les producteurs et sur les consommateurs dans la plupart des régions, par comparaison au scénario de base. Ces impacts pourraient se chiffrer entre 2 et 5 milliards de dollars. Des calculs modélisés, il ressort que l'Union Européenne resterait lourdement protégée, même après l'extension de l'AAUR jusqu'en 2005 et que ses producteurs laitiers seront ceux qui auront le plus à perdre d'une libéralisation plus radicale du commerce àl'expiration de l'Accord. En revanche, les producteurs laitiers des régions exportatrices à faibles coûts de production, comme la Nouvelle-Zélande, l'Australie et la partie méridionale de l'Amérique du Sud sont ceux qui auront le plus à gagner. Les impacts de GATT 2005 sur le Japan, sur les États-Unis et sur le Canada seraient relativement peu importants.