Keynesian Inefficiency and Optimal Policy: A New Monetarist Approach

A simple model of monetary/labor search is constructed to study Keynesian indeterminacy and optimal policy. In the model, economic agents have trouble splitting the surplus from exchange appropriately, and we consider monetary and fiscal policies that correct this Keynesian inefficiency. A Taylor rule neither implies determinacy, nor does it support an efficient outcome. An optimal policy yields an efficient and determinate allocation of resources, but equilibrium policy actions, wages, and prices are indeterminate at the optimum.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME INEQUALITY REVISITED: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL

We investigate the causal relationship between income inequality and economic freedom using data from U.S. states over the period 1981 to 2004 within a panel error correction model framework. The results indicate bidirectional causality between income inequality and economic freedom in both the short and the long run. These results suggest that high income inequality may cause states to implement redistributive policies causing economic freedom to decline. As economic freedom declines, income inequality rises even more. In other words, it is quite possible for a state to get caught in a vicious circle of high income inequality and heavy redistribution. (JEL D63, H11)     

Immigration of Nurses

This paper examines the effects of immigration on a specific occupation, registered nurses (RNs). To learn whether immigrant nurses reduced the earnings of RNs, we applied techniques developed by Goldin (1994) and Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996), but found the effect of immigrant penetration either positive or insignificant. We also found that the supply of immigrant RNs was far more elastic than the supply coming from natives. It is often argued that it will be hard to detect negative effects on wages and employment of natives in local markets, because natives will avoid a market which many immigrants have entered. This study finds no support for this hypothesis in this market, based on data that measures the rate of entry of RNs exactly. We find no adverse effect of immigration on native workers in this occupation.     

ESTIMATING THE NON-ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS IS HARDER THAN YOU THINK

Top-down and bottom-up models of the non-environmental consequences of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions embody different implicit theories of economic organizations. Yet neither approach is explicit in showing the detailed computations that must be traced if the activities of firms are to be described realistically. Specification of firms' computational processes leads inevitably to a consideration of potential computational limits on the behavior of organizations. It is known that solutions of some standard economic problems are not effectively computable, and that the solutions to others are computationally intractable. These fundamental computational limits have strong implications for the theory of the firm, and recognizing their existence and importance suggests new policy approaches for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. (JEL C6, D2, L2, Q4)     

PATENT LENGTH AND THE TIMING OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY

The standard result in patent policy, as demonstrated by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), is that infinitely lived but very narrow patents are optimal as deadweight losses are minimised and spread through time but inventors can still recover their R&D expenditures. By extending their innovative environment to include timing as an important choice, we demonstrate that a finitely lived, but broader, patent can be socially desirable. This is because a patent breadth is a better instrument than length to encourage socially optimal timing. Thus, patents need not be infinitely long in order to encourage a greater number of inventions     

ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION ON PRIVATE LAND

This paper analyzes the effect of alternative institutional arrangements on the conservation of endangered species and economic activity on private land. Because a landowner does not capture the full value of species conservation, her preferences on land use will not coincide with social preferences. Under current law, the landowner has incentives to invest in lowering conservation value and to deny access to regulators in order to prevent collection of information. Paying compensation corrects many of these perverse incentives. An alternative approach is to limit the ability of landowners to affect the regulatory outcome. Whether it is better to entice landowners to make socially efficient decisions by paying compensation or to limit the ability of landowners to affect outcomes through changes in the regulatory regime depends on both practical implementation difficulties and distributive justice considerations.