Receiving,Recording, and Responding to Customer Complaints: The Effects of Formalizing Customer Complaint Handling Policies in Retail Firms

ABSTRACT

Given the critical need for retail firms to provide high quality customer service and satisfaction, this article investigates the importance of formalizing customer complaint handling policies and procedures with regard to its relationship to the ways in which retail companies receive, record, and respond to customer complaints. A survey of 184 firms from the retail environment of a midsized community reveals that the existence of such formalized procedures is significantly associated with firm size, better channels of communication with customers, mechanisms of recording customer feedback, and better-trained employees, which have been shown to relate to higher firm performance.     

Corruption and the public display of wealth

We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials.     

A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: The relationship between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies

An obstacle to the widespread adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such as stationary and mobile fuel cells is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem, even when some consumers may be willing to pay more for green technologies. Drawing on recent percolation models of diffusion, we develop a network model of new technology diffusion that combines contagion among consumers with heterogeneity of agent characteristics. Agents adopt when the price falls below their random reservation price drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one of their neighbors has already adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a function of the cumulative number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain range of initial conditions. Using agent-based simulations we explore when a limited subsidy policy can trigger diffusion that would otherwise not happen. The introduction of a subsidy policy seems to be highly effective for a given high initial price level only for learning economies in a certain range. Outside this range, the diffusion of a new technology either never takes off despite the subsidies, or the subsidies are unnecessary. Perhaps not coincidentally, this range seems to correspond to the values observed for many successful innovations.     

Functions of innovation systems as a framework to understand sustainable technological change: Empirical evidence for earlier claims

Understanding the emergence of innovation systems is recently put central in research analysing the process of technological change. Especially the key activities that are important for the build up of an innovation system receive much attention. These are labelled ‘functions of innovation systems’. This paper builds on five empirical studies, related to renewable energy technologies, to test whether the functions of innovation systems framework is a valid framework to analyse processes of technological change. We test the claim that a specific set of functions is suitable. We also test the claim made in previous publications that the interactions between system functions accelerate innovation system emergence and growth. Both claims are confirmed.     

Information acquisition,referral, and organization

Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.     

Agrarian landscapes: from marginal areas to cultural landscapes—paths to sustainable tourism in small villages—the case of Vico Del Gargano in the club of the Borghi più belli d’Italia

Quality & Quantity - The territory of Gargano is recognized for its stunning landscapes and the ecological variety of its natural spaces, both within the boundaries of the National Park and...     

What role does CEO vision play in the internationalization process of firms? Evidence from the banking sector in Africa

This study examines the cross‐border expansion of four major African banks from 1988 to 2014 in order to investigate the role of CEO vision in influencing their international investment decisions. The qualitative case study approach is complemented by a quantitative analysis that examines the multiple factors influencing internationalization patterns. The results from both types of analysis indicate that the vision of the CEO matters, and that it is a key factor in explaining the accelerated internationalization of three of the four banks examined in this study. These results stress the need for considering managerial decision making in international resource commitment decisions, particularly in an emerging market context, where a shared developmental vision might be shaping the behavior of the entrepreneurs.