The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses

We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria becomes much larger than the unconditional expected number as the size of the game grows.     

DEBT FORGIVENESS AND STOCK PRICE REACTION OF LENDING BANKS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

We provide a simple model for analyzing how debt forgiveness affects the stock price of a lending bank. Our model shows that although debt forgiveness increases shareholder wealth of a bank in healthy financial condition, it decreases shareholder wealth of a bank in unhealthy financial condition. We empirically investigate the announcement effect of debt forgiveness on bank stock prices in Japanese markets. On average, lending banks experience a significant negative announcement effect with respect to debt forgiveness. Consistent with the prediction of the model, we find a negative relation between the announcement effect and the net bad loan ratio as a proxy of the unhealthiness of the financial condition of the bank.     

On Land Price Formation: Bubble Versus Option

This paper investigates the theory of land price formation, taking into consideration the fact that an "option" is implicitly attached to land. Using a theoretical model, it tries to explain the land price bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s as the result of investors' expectations of alternative uses of the land. The model is estimated and validated using data on the Tokyo metropolitan residential area. The modelling exercise also determines the extent to which the option contributes to the formation of land prices. It is shown that the separation of the land price from its fundamental value can be satisfactorily explained by the option property of land.
JEL Classification Numbers: C53, G12, R14.     

The Perceptual Gaps Between Companies’ and University Students’ Views on Fundamental Competencies

This study examines the gap between the competencies that companies expect of university students and those that university students believe companies are seeking. We find that a gap exists between companies’ and students’ evaluations of the competencies required in the workplace. Surprisingly, companies’ and students’ priorities related to competencies are different. Our results show that both companies and students highly value versatile personal competencies as essential skills for employees. Teamwork skills are not a top priority for companies although students value them highest of the various attributes. Gaps also exist between the two groups regarding their evaluation of personality traits. These findings contribute to the development of appropriate curricula for universities and career education.     

SUNK COSTS OF CAPITAL AND THE FORM OF ENTERPRISE: INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS AND WORKER‐OWNED FIRMS*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor‐owned and worker‐owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result.     

Inflexibility of Share Repurchases*

This paper investigates the flexibility inherent in open market share repurchases. Open market share repurchases are recognized as being flexible, since managers believe that they are not an ongoing commitment. However, I find that such returns significantly decrease upon announcing the completion of a repurchase program if firms do not concurrently announce new program authorizations. I also find that announcement returns significantly decline with completion rates and that a high completion rate acts as a negative signal, revealing that firms have finished the repurchasing activities and do not intend to continue share repurchasing in the foreseeable future. These results indicate that share repurchases are less flexible than they were previously thought to be.     

Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games

The present paper considers equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products, and an example is presented in which two strict Nash equilibria are simultaneously globally accessible when the friction is sufficiently small. Second, a class of games with invariant diagonal are proposed and shown to generically admit an absorbing and globally accessible equilibrium for small frictions.     

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×2$2\times 2$ coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals.