哈萨克斯坦石油工业综述

哈萨克斯坦油气资源丰富,2007年,哈萨克斯坦国家储量委员会批准的包括哈属里海水域在内的石油探明可采储量约48亿吨.在哈14个州中,有6个州发现了油气田.哈萨克斯坦原油产量在独联体国家中仅次于俄罗斯,油气工业是其国民经济的支柱产业,2008年共生产原油及凝析油7062万吨,生产天然气332亿立方米,其中约有85%以上的原油用于出口.随着里海海上油田的投产,哈萨克斯坦的原油年产量将超过亿吨.近年来哈通过技术改造、兼并收购等措施大力提升炼油业发展水平.面对国际油价的变化,哈政府采取更加务实的油气资源和财税政策,及时调整油气政策以保障本国的利益.     

The Benefits of Political Connection: Evidence from Individual Bank-Loan Contracts

This paper investigates whether political connections improve the access of firms to financing. We propose three hypotheses to prove that political benefits exist. First, do politically connected firms obtain preferential treatment for bank loans? Second, if these firms do obtain preferential treatment, do they benefit from government-owned banks (GOBs) more than from privately owned banks? Third, is the preferential treatment from GOBs enhanced during presidential election years? We examine these three questions by using detailed data on political connections and 69,332 individual bank-loan contracts for listed firms in Taiwan from 1991 to 2008. The empirical results generally support our hypotheses.     

审计风险模式的演变及风险导向审计的新发展

随着社会经济的发展和企业经营的复杂化,传统风险导向审计方法已经难以适应社会的需要,现代风险导向审计应运而生。本文从审计风险模式的演变入手,从审计准则和审计实务两个方面介绍了风险导向审计的最新发展,并在此基础上提出对我国的启示和借鉴之处。     

造社区不只是造房子

小王和小赵新婚燕尔,高高兴兴地搬进了一套50平方米的小户型新居,并对这套精心挑选的新房赞叹不已。然而,没过多久,欣喜却变成了抱怨和不满。原来,这套新房虽然格局、朝向、价格都令他们十分满意,但由于这个小区内全部是小户型,住户密度非常高,社区建设前期考虑不够,造成上下班     

利润概念之法学完善

利润是企业设立之目标,但会计的利润概念却未能揭示其本质属性。文章通过对利润产生依据的分析,以及对利得与损失计量依据的分析,提出了利润概念的新定义。利润是指会计主体的一定期间权利行使与责任承担的结果。     

美俄在里海石油及管道问题上的博弈分析

本文通过对里海石油及石油管道问题的分析,从经济和政治的角度出发,运用博弈论中的连续对策和纳什均衡的方法,具体划分了四个阶段来分析美俄里海石油博弈现状的形成过程和可能的走向问题。最后,对美俄在里海石油的博弈得出了具体结论,并对博弈的效率问题、多方博弈的可能性问题、可能的走向问题等进行了讨论。     

晶化时间对CoAPO-11分子筛合成过程中转晶的影响

本文研究了晶化时间对低钴含量(x=0.1)的CoAPO-11分子筛合成过程中转晶现象的影响,并采用XRD、SEM对产物进行表征。结果表明,200℃下晶化48 h,可获得纯相CoAPO-11;当晶化时间超过48 h时,产物便开始向[Co-Al-P-O]-GIS型分子筛转化;晶化延长至72 h时,产物已全部转化为[Co-Al-P-O]-GIS型分子筛,该转化过程不可逆。从分子筛骨架结构单元出发,阐述了转晶现象的内在影响因素。     

The effect of tax avoidance crackdown on corporate innovation

To constrain the use of intangible assets in tax-motivated state income shifting, many U.S. state governments adopted addback statutes. Addback statutes reduce the tax benefits that firms can gain from creating intangible assets such as patents. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we examine the effect of addback statutes on corporate innovation behavior. First, the adoption of addback statutes leads to a 4.77 percentage point decrease in the number of patents and a 5.12 percentage point decrease in the number of patent citations. Second, the “disappearing patents” resulting from addback statutes have significant economic value. Third, after a state adopts an addback statute, a firm with material subsidiaries in that state assigns fewer patents to subsidiaries in zero-tax states, whereas the number of patents assigned to the other states does not change. Overall, our findings suggest that addback statutes impede corporate innovation.     

萌芽时期的中国近代法学教育——基于南洋公学特班的研究

在中国近代法律教育体系确立前,诸多新式学校是传播法学知识的主要机构,它们选择教育模式及其生员学习西方法学知识的过程,展现出了法学教育启蒙时期的探索。学界对中国近代法学教育在萌芽时期的具体教学形态的阐述实际并不清楚。在这一时期,南洋公学特班的法学教育尤其值得注意,从其师生日记可见,特班借鉴传统书院制教学的同时糅合了中西之学,其教育内容不再囿于"交涉公法",体现出的比较法学教育的精神、西方公法知识的输入等现象,也是这一时期新式学校法学教育的共同特征。     

Does Joint Bidding Reduce Competition? Evidence from Hong Kong Land Auctions

This paper analyses firms’ bidding behavior in auctions for development land in Hong Kong. The real estate market in Hong Kong is considered to be oligopolistic as it is dominated by a few top real estate firms, which have strong financial strength/development capacity and large land banks. Joint bidding is used by other real estate firms (“large” firms) to pool resources/capital in order to compete with the top firms. We test whether joint bidding increases or decreases the level of competition in land auctions, using land auction data in Hong Kong from 1991 to 2011. We find that large real estate firms are more likely to be successful than top firms at auctions when bidding jointly. However, joint bidding/winning does not harm competition as reflected by the number of bids, bids per bidder and number of bidders. Land prices also increase significantly in auctions won by joint bidders or alliances of large developers. Our results suggest that joint bidding enhances competition by allowing large firms to act strategically by pooling their resources and act aggressively to compete with the top firms.