Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.We wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Benyamin Shitoviz, Tayfun Sonmez, William Thomson, the participants of the Southeastern Economic Theory Meeting in Charlottesville and the seminars at CORE and University of Tsukuba for useful discussions and comments. Our special thanks due anonymous referee for the suggestion to add a section addressing the issue of existence of a strong Nash equilibrium.     

Accountability and performance management: citizens’ willingness to monitor public officials

ABSTRACT

In recent decades, the operating mechanisms of states and societies have transformed from traditional hierarchical relationships into a more horizontal structure. In this new setting, citizens may have a critical role in monitoring public accountability. This article explores citizens’ willingness to monitor public officials’ accountability and the factors that may influence it. Using a survey distributed in Israel in 2016, the analysis indicates that citizens view these interactions in terms of collective action problems aimed at minimizing freeriding. Government policy in these areas is irrelevant to citizens’ calculations.     

Maturing born globals and their acquisitive behaviour

Born globals are becoming more common in our interconnected world. While a body of knowledge exists regarding the establishment and early growth of born globals, we know less about how these companies develop. Arguing that acquiring new knowledge, technologies, and products will enable companies to survive beyond their initial success, the current study specifically aims to explore the value of technology-motivated acquisitions, and their effect on performance. To this end, the study employs a hybrid methodology; statistically studying 108 acquisitions conducted by 45 maturing, technology-based born globals in Israel over a period of 10 years, and further substantiate the findings with an in-depth case analysis of four sample companies. The results indicate that technology-motivated acquisitions are valuable in terms of both financial performance and independent survival, but that there likely exists an optimal threshold, indicating that such a strategy, though beneficial, should be carefully managed.     

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities

This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions inno spillovernoncooperative games withPositive externalitywhich admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist, in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, we impose two additional assumptions,AnonymityandOrder preservation. The proof of our main result is carried out by constructing, for a given gameG, a potential function Ψ over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of Ψ yields a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies ofG.Journal of Economics LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D62, H73.     

Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules

We consider a finite society with of individuals distributed along the real line. The individuals form jurisdictions to consume public projects, equally share their costs and, in addition, bear a transportation cost to the location of the project. We examine a core and Nash notions of stable jurisdiction structures and show that in hedonic games both solution sets could be empty. We demonstrate that in a quasi-hedonic set-up there is a Nash stable partition, but, in general, there are no core stable partitions. We then examine a subclass of societies that admits the existence of both types of stable partitions. Financial support through grants R98-0631 from the Economic Education and Research Consortium, # NSh-1939.2003.6 School Support, Russian Foundation for Basic Research No. 04-02-17227, and the Russian Science Support Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good

Guesnerie and Oddou [J. Econom. Theory25 (1981), 67–91] raised the open question whether an economy, in which the production of a public good is financed via proportional taxation, has a stable structure. By means of the first example a negative answer to this question is provided. The second example shows that a stable structure may fail to exist even if all the individuals have the same initial endowments in private good.     

The role of HRM and social capital configuration for knowledge sharing in post-M&A integration: a framework for future empirical investigation

The literature on human resource management (HRM) indicates that HRM plays an important role in merger and acquisition (M&A) integration success, but pays little attention to the mechanisms for knowledge sharing in post-M&A integration. Limited work has been carried out to provide understanding on how social capital and HRM practices influence intra-organizational knowledge sharing in M&A integration. This paper primarily focuses on the phenomenon of social capital and HRM practices – one of the primary means by which knowledge sharing can occur within firms. The main aim of this paper is to provide an alternative framework that introduces the literature on HRM and social capital to discuss how HRM practices and the various dimensions of social capital may enhance knowledge sharing in post-M&A integration. Drawing on the literature on social capital and HRM, we offer an alternative view on the issue of knowledge sharing in M&A integration by explaining how specific HRM practices that have an impact on employees’ knowledge, skills and abilities for participating in knowledge sharing activities may depend on relational, cognitive and structural social capital. We isolate a number of HRM practices and social capital variables that may enhance knowledge sharing in post-M&A integration, and develop a research model and propositions for future empirical investigation.     

Human resource management in Chinese multinationals in the United Kingdom: The interplay of institutions,culture, and strategic choice

This is a study of the challenges faced by Chinese expatriate managers and their strategic responses in securing a workable degree of alignment in UK subsidiaries, against a backdrop of competing home‐country and host‐country pressures. Although much of the literature on home‐country and host‐country effects tends to either adopt a culture or an institutional approach, this study highlights the intermeshed nature of the two. In locating cultural dynamics within an institutional firmament, this study juxtaposes the effects of each and draws conclusions as to their intersection. It is founded on in‐depth interviews with home‐country and host‐country managers. The findings suggest, on the one hand, Chinese expatriate managers tended to see local regulations as an obstacle to efficiency, rather than as a means to access context‐specific complementarities. On the other hand, these managers recognized the need to fit in with established locally specific ways of doing things and in securing sufficient staff buy in to sustain operations, and played a key intermediary role between headquarters and subsidiary.