Dimensions of uncertainty and their moderating effect on new product development project performance

In this study, we measure the dimensions of uncertainty, starting from the definitions constructed for and generally used in innovation projects. We then evaluate their direct and indirect effects on the performance of product and service development projects. Four dimensions of uncertainty are delimited with satisfactory validity and reliability, suggesting a differential moderating effect of the four types of uncertainty (technical and project uncertainty, market uncertainty, fuzziness and complexity) depending on the performance dimension (effectiveness and efficiency) and co‐moderator (project methods and human resource adequacy). Of the four dimensions explored, technical and project, and market uncertainty are true moderators and have the largest interactive effect, fuzziness has a strong direct effect on both performance dimensions whereas complexity weakly directly influences effectiveness. The latter two also influence the relations between performance and the factors related to human resources and project management methods.     

What labelling policy for consumer choice? The case of genetically modified food in Canada and Europe

Abstract. Faced with divergent opinions among consumers on the use of genetically modified (GM) foods, Canada has adopted a voluntary labelling approach for non‐GM foods, whereas the European Union has a mandatory labelling policy for GM foods. Interestingly, both labelling systems have resulted in very little, if any, additional consumer choice. Using an analytical model, we show that the coexistence of GM and non‐GM products at the retail level depends on the labelling policy, consumer perceptions, and the type of product. Although voluntary labelling tends to favour the use of GM products, it is more likely to provide consumer choice.     

Estimating demand with distance functions: Parameterization in the primal and dual

Our purpose is to investigate the ability of different parametric forms to ‘correctly’ estimate consumer demands based on distance functions using Monte Carlo methods. Our approach combines economic theory, econometrics and quadratic approximation. We begin by deriving parameterizations for transformed quadratic functions which are linear in parameters and characterized by either homogeneity or which satisfy the translation property. Homogeneity is typical of Shephard distance functions and expenditure functions, whereas translation is characteristic of benefit/shortage or directional distance functions. The functional forms which satisfy these conditions and include both first- and second-order terms are the translog and quadratic forms, respectively. We then derive a primal characterization which is homogeneous and parameterized as translog and a dual model which satisfies the translation property and is specified as quadratic. We assess functional form performance by focusing on empirical violations of the regularity conditions. Our analysis corroborates results from earlier Monte Carlo studies on the production side suggesting that the quadratic form more closely approximates the ‘true’ technology or in our context consumer preferences than the translog.     

Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

Looking Forward to Performance Improvement: A Field Test of the Feedforward Interview for Performance Management

This study examines the effectiveness of the feedforward interview for improving the job performance of employees relative to a traditional performance appraisal interview in a business equipment firm. Managers (n = 25) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Employees (n = 70) who engaged in a feedforward interview with their manager were observed by an anonymous peer to perform significantly better on the job four months later than employees (n = 75) who received the company's traditional performance appraisal interview. The finding that the feedforward intervention increased performance relative to the performance appraisal indicates that the effect is a relatively enduring one. The results suggest that the feedforward interview should prove useful for human resource managers who are searching for ways to increase the performance of their organization's human resources over and above the traditional performance appraisal. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers     

Financial Reporting Quality in Private Equity Backed Companies: The Impact of Ownership Concentration

We empirically show on a sample of 270 unquoted, private equity backed companies that the shareholder structure of private companies impacts the quality of their publicly available accounting information. More precisely, companies in which private equity (PE) investors have a high equity stake produce lower quality accounting information than companies in which PE investors have a low equity stake, after controlling for factors like company size and age. We explain our findings by arguing that PE investors with low equity stakes have a higher need for high quality accounting information whereas PE investors with high equity stakes have other means to closely monitor their portfolio companies. This paper has benefited form discussions with workshop participants at the Max Planck Institute. We specifically want to thank Lorraine Uhlaner and Mike Wright (guest editors), two anonymous referees as well as ignace De Beelde, Wouter De Maeseneire, Marc Deloof, Miguel Meuleman and Lloyd Steier for helpful suggestions. Part of this research was completed when Christof Beuselinck was an FWO Scholar at Ghent University. Financial support from the Fonds of Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Grant G.0012.02) is kindly appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies.