Public service restructuring in the UK: the case of the English National Health Service

This article overviews welfare state retrenchment in the UK under the Conservative‐led coalition government that formed in May 2010 and has centred its response to economic crisis on rapid public deficit reduction through public expenditure austerity targeted increasingly on the welfare benefits budget. It locates the coalition's reforms of public services and public sector employment relations in the long trajectory of public sector restructuring in the UK: the policies of New Right governments in the 1980s and New Labour from 1997 to 2010 that installed marketisation and privatisation in a permutation of forms, intensifying challenges for trade union organising. Focusing on the English NHS, the article identifies the respects in which the coalition's reforms continue and depart from New Labour's.     

Hospitality versus Exchange: The Limits of Monetary Economies

This paper attempts to specify theoretically the origins of money. Rather than the exchange-based view of neoclassical economists where money is seen as a transaction cost-reducing instrument (and where exchange itself is asserted to be a universal phenomenon), we argue that money is a social relationship, specifically a debt relationship, that emerges with propertied, class society. "Primitive" (pre-class) society could not generate money, as the rule of hospitality, universally practiced among such organizations, precluded debt and the self-interested behavior that is consistent with debt. Adopting the Chartalist position on the matter, we show that money is symptomatic of privilege, of inequality, of economic and political power.     

Performance evaluation of the English Premier Football League with data envelopment analysis

This paper uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to evaluate the performance of English Premier League football clubs from 1998/99 to 2002/03 combining sport and financial variables. The paper evaluates how close the clubs are relative to the frontier of best practices, analysing how they manage sport as well as financial results. Managerial implications of the research are devised.     

Who should get the champagne spoils?

There are two main stages in the champagne production chain: the growing of the grapes, and the production and marketing of the drink itself. The surplus created by the protected champagne name can provide plenty of profit for both the grape growers and the champagne houses. But dividing the surplus between the two has become more difficult in recent years. The growers have enjoyed increased bargaining strength, reflecting the new ease with which they can market champagne themselves. Their efforts to take a large proportion of the profits have undermined the source of those profits. There are lessons from the story for everyone involved in negotiating a fair share of the profits to which their work contributes.     

Y2K

This paper studies, within a general equilibrium model, the dynamics of Year 2000 (Y2K)-type shocks: anticipated, permanent losses in output whose magnitude can be lessened by investing resources in advance. The implied dynamics replicate three observed characteristics of those triggered by the Y2K bug. (1) Precautionary investment: Investment in solving the Y2K problem begins before the year 2000. (2) Investment delay: Although economic agents have been aware of the Y2K problem since the 1960s, investment did not begin until recently. (3) Investment acceleration: As the new millennium approaches, the amount of resources allocated to solving the Y2K problem increases. In addition, the model predicts that Y2K investment peaks at the end of 1999. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E22, E32     

Patience auctions: the impact of time vs. money bidding on elicited discount rates

We introduce, test, and compare two auction-based methods for eliciting discount rates. In these “patience auctions”, participants bid the smallest future sum they would prefer -or- the longest time they would wait for a reward, rather than receive a smaller, immediate payoff. The most patient bidder receives the delayed reward; all others receive the immediate payoff. These auctions allow us to compare discounting when participants’ attention is focused on the temporal versus monetary dimension of delayed rewards. We find that the estimated parameters in the three most commonly used discount functions (exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic) differ across these two bidding methods (time-bids vs. money-bids). Specifically, our participants tend to show more impatience under time-bids. Furthermore, we find that people are more likely to exhibit exponential (as opposed to hyperbolic) discounting and exhibit less present bias under time-bids, compared to money-bids. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to directly compare time versus money preference elicitations, within the same subjects, using an incentive-compatible mechanism.     

Renewable Energy Policy Instruments and Market Power

Markets for green certificates allow generators with market power to squeeze the margins of their competitors, as a generator that is vertically integrated into network activities might do. We analyze this issue in a stylized electricity industry in which a dominant producer of both conventional and renewable energy is facing a competitive fringe of renewable‐energy producers. We demonstrate that whether or not a dominant firm is vertically integrated into network activities, it can disadvantage the fringe producers by distorting certificates prices, thereby inducing cost inefficiency in the generation of renewable energy. We compare green certificates to a system of feed‐in tariffs, where a similar margin squeeze is not possible.