Incentives for inventors: Theory of market and planned economies

There have been few reviews of the comparative incentives for inventors in market and planned economies. This theoretical analysis suggests that market economies provide the stronger incentives regarding generally unanticipated invention, while planned economies are the better for anticipated inventions. To achieve a preferred mix between types of invention, the incentives for the anticipated type may need supplementing with patents. Other implications for public policy under both autarky and trade are also examined.     

The theory of reform and indian indirect taxes

Given a set of value judgements, an initial state, and a model of the economy, one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare. We do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the ith good. The inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non-negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum. If no such welfare weights exist, then a Pareto improvement is possible. We illustrate the concepts and results using data from the Indian economy for 1979–1980. Directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for Pareto improvements are presented.     

THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON PROPERTY CRIME

Using U.S. data from 1950 to 2010, we analyze to what extent inflation raises the incidence of property crime. To match our theoretical predictions, we consider different types of property crime (larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery) and broad and narrow definitions of inflation separately. We control for the state of the business cycle and demographic changes over time explicitly. Unobserved or difficult‐to‐measure determinants of property crime are captured through a stochastic‐trend specification within a state‐space framework. We find a robust statistical link between inflation and each of the four property crime rates. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of inflation and the inclusion or exclusion of different control variables. In terms of policy, our findings suggest that monetary policy that creates inflation has costly spillover effects. (JEL J10, J11)     

When do firms change technology‐sourcing vehicles? The role of poor innovative performance and financial slack

This paper examines the adjustments firms make to the composition of their portfolios of technology‐sourcing vehicles (i.e., alliance, acquisition, or go‐it‐alone) in response to poor innovative performance. We advance a behavioral perspective on the make/buy/ally question, suggesting that differences in financial slack will generate different portfolio decisions. Specifically, we posit that firms with greater levels of financial slack are more likely to respond to poor innovative performance by opting for (1) greater vehicle diversification, and (2) new sourcing vehicles, while firms with less financial slack will respond by (1) downscoping their portfolio of sourcing vehicles, and (2) reverting to more familiar vehicles. We find support for our predictions using extensive data from the population of U.S. public pharmaceutical firms from 1992 to 2006. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Whom are you promoting? Positive voluntary public disclosures and executive turnover

Research summary: This paper uses signaling theory to bring together two complementary research streams that have largely ignored each other: strategic human resource management and media relations management. We argue that when publicly traded firms voluntarily and publicly disclose positive information about their value creation and appropriation activities, they also send positive signals to managerial labor markets regarding executives' capabilities. Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive association between public disclosures and voluntary executive turnover. An analysis of pharmaceutical and communications equipment firms from 1990 to 2004 supports this prediction, underscoring the need to understand better the effects of voluntary public disclosures on a firm's ability to protect its human capital. More generally, our results highlight the importance of considering the impact of a single signal on multiple receivers. Managerial summary: Given the organizational benefits of positive media coverage, the considerable effort that firms put into managing their image in the media is not surprising. We argue and show, however, that when a firm enhances its public image it also improves its executives' positions in the managerial labor market and, by so doing, increases their likelihood of voluntarily leaving the firm. In particular, we find that corporate press releases, an important mechanism for managing information released in the public domain to signal a firm's competitive advantages, may result in unintentional loss of senior management talent. This trade‐off suggests that firms should increase coordination between their strategy, human resources, and corporate communications/investor relations departments to ensure that they collectively weigh the benefits and costs of publicly disclosing value‐relevant information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Regulatory Governance and Privatization on Electricity Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies

This article assesses whether a regulatory law and higher qualityregulatory governance are associated with superior outcomesin the electricity industry. The analysis, for 28 developingeconomies over 1980–2001, draws on theoretical and empiricalwork on the impact of telecommunications regulators in developingeconomies. Controlling for privatization and competition andallowing for country-specific fixed effects, both regulatorylaw and higher quality regulatory governance are positivelyand significantly associated with higher per capita generationcapacity. This positive impact increases for more than 10 years,as experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. Theresults are robust to estimating alternative dynamic specifications(including error correction models), to inclusion of economygovernance political risk indicators, and to controlling forpossible endogeneity biases. The article concludes with a shortdiscussion of causality in panel data modeling of governancemodels and the policy implications for regulatory reform.