The Firm's Management of Social Interactions

Consumer choice is influenced in a direct and meaningful way by the actions taken by others. These “actions” range from face-to-face recommendations from a friend to the passive observation of what a stranger is wearing. We refer to the set of such contexts as “social interactions” (SI). We believe that at least some of the SI effects are partially within the firm's control and that this represents an exciting research opportunity. We present an agenda that identifies a list of unanswered questions of potential interest to both researchers and managers. In order to appreciate the firm's choices with respect to its management of SI, it is important to first evaluate where we are in terms of understanding the phenomena themselves. We highlight five questions in this regard: (1) What are the antecedents of word of mouth (WOM)? (2) How does the transmission of positive WOM differ from that of negative WOM? (3) How does online WOM differ from offline WOM? (4) What is the impact of WOM? (5) How can we measure WOM? Finally, we identify and discuss four principal, non-mutually exclusive, roles that the firm might play: (1) observer, (2) moderator, (3) mediator, and (4) participant.     

Is Fiscal Policy Sustainable in Developing Economies?

This paper investigates fiscal policy sustainability in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela using competing methodologies. Standard unit roots and cointegration analyses do not endorse the validity of the intertemporal budget constraint. In contrast, to varying degrees across countries, alternative testing employing a fiscal policy reaction function indicates sustainability defined as surplus adjustments in response to higher debt‐to‐income ratios. Corresponding debt‐dynamics analyses show that corrective measures were put in place to revert non‐sustainable trends in government debt. However, ancillary variables in the debt modeling produce statistically weak evidence of procyclical fiscal behavior in the Latin American countries.     

Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints. With a labour market that is subject to moral hazard, the increased effort raises social welfare. Policies that reduce credit market imperfections, or redistribute income, may reduce welfare by dampening this effect.     

Schooling, Informal Experience, and Formal Sector Earnings: A Study of Indian Workers

This paper estimates an earnings function for male workers belonging to the Indian corporate sector. The model allows for differential rates of return to schooling and distinguishes tenure from total labor market experience. The rate of return to schooling is found to be low up to the junior level, increases significantly at the secondary and undergraduate levels, but sharply declines at the masters level. Seniority and firm-specific factors are found to be important determinants of earnings. When years of unemployment and informal experience are incorporated, earnings of low-education workers appear to be driven entirely by formal-sector experience.     

Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint-liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group-lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.     

Financially Interlinked Business Groups*

Financial interlinkage, in the form of cross-holding of equity and debt between firms, characterizes business groups in many countries. We suggest that such financial interlinkage can be viewed as a way to solve credit rationing caused by asymmetric information. If firms possess better information about each other than a bank, then business groups can be a mechanism to induce firms to sort on the basis of this information. Banks can offer a menu of contracts that vary in the extent of financial interlinkage to induce firms to self-select on the basis of the equilibrium composition of the business groups they can form.     

Labour migration in the Indian states and the Todarian hypothesis

The model of migration in developing countries developed by Todaro and others, in which the driving force behind rural-urban migration is the wage differential between urban and rural areas is examined using 1971 and 1981 census data for the states of India. The results do not provide any evidence supporting this model, which the author suggests is not surprising given the imperfect product and factor markets prevailing in India.     

Identifying periods of market inefficiency for return predictability

The article examines the efficiency of 31 stock index series spanning 26 countries across the world, using generalized spectral test (GST) and detects departure from the martingale difference hypothesis (MDH). A moving window of 24 months was used and p-values of GST were estimated. In order to explore whether the departure from market efficiency can be used for generating profitable trades, an exponentially weighted-moving-average-based trading rule was applied and was found that average profits per trade were significantly higher when p-value of the GST was less than 0.1. These observations are in consistent with the adapted market hypothesis.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.