Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

On the Statistical Significance of Event Effects on Unsystematic Volatility

We develop a method for determining the significance of the effect of a certain event (stock split, corporate restructuring, change in regulation, etc.) on unsystematic volatility of asset returns. Simulations show that the suggested tests reject the true null hypothesis of no effect on volatility at appropriate levels, whereas the rejection rates of a false null hypothesis increase with the magnitude of the effect. An application of the method to corporate spin‐offs reveals statistically significant and long‐lasting estimated increases in unsystematic volatility of parent companies' returns.     

Nonlinear dynamics and competing behavioral interpretations: Evidence from intra‐day FTSE‐100 index and futures data

Extant empirical research has reported nonlinear behavior within arbitrage relationships. In this article, the authors consider potential nonlinear dynamics within FTSE‐100 index and index‐futures. Such nonlinearity can be rationalized by the existence of transactions costs or through the interaction between informed and noise traders. They consider several empirical models designed to capture these alternative dynamics. Their empirical results provide evidence of a stationary basis term, and thus cointegration between index and index‐futures, and the presence of nonlinear dynamics within that relationship. The results further suggest that noise traders typically engage in momentum trading and are more prone to this behavior type when the underlying market is rising. Fundamental, or arbitrage, traders are characterized by heterogeneity, such that there is slow movement between regimes of behavior. In particular, fundamental traders act more quickly in response to small deviations from equilibrium, but are reluctant to act quickly in response to larger mispricings that are exposed to greater noise trader price risk. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:343–368, 2006     

Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.      

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Harmonizing the interests of a city and its region: Krasnoyarsk krai experience

The paper focuses on the emerging system of territorial strategic planning in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and municipalities. Suggested for practical application are the best Russian research studies and practices of coordinating the interests of municipal and regional authorities. The analysis of scholarly approaches to the issue in focus allows one to infer that the best elaborated position is that of the staff of the North-Western Office of the Russian Research Center for Local Governance (RRCLG). As regards the express-analysis of practices adopted in the number of the Russian Federation constituent entities, the practices of the Krasnodar krai appear to be the most promising.     

Social Capital and the Terms of Trade for Farmland

Social capital is a person or group's sympathy for or sense of obligation to another person or group. This article introduces social capital into a neoclassical model of farmland exchange and shows how relationships alter the terms of trade. Empirical evidence from a survey of farmers shows that the type of relationship farmland sellers have with farmland buyers has a statistically significant and economically important effect on the minimum-sell price for farmland. Compared to the minimum-sell price when selling to a total stranger in an arm's-length transaction, farmland sellers discount prices to friendly neighbors and relatives and require a premium from unfriendly neighbors and influential people in the community.